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ABSTRACT 
The thesis focuses on aircraft carriers and identifying 
an appropriate path towards the future of U.S. sea-based air 
power by studying historical cases of air power integration 
into the war fighting capabilities of the fleet. It analyzes 
current utilization and effectiveness of the aircraft 
carrier, given its operational requirements with respect to 
identified threats as described in security and strategy 
statements. It can be agreed upon that the U.S. Navy 
requires air cover; but whether air cover should be sea-
based in the form of super carriers, jeep carriers, 
VTOL/STOVL aircraft on many vessels, or even land-based USAF 
protection in littoral settings, is the question this thesis 
investigates. Proponents of U.S. super carriers suggest no 
other single asset in the U.S. military arsenal can bring as 
much concentrated striking power to U.S. decisionmakers’ 
ability to respond to crises nearly anywhere in the world. 
Despite this, a fundamental question arises: What does the 
future hold for sea-based air power? Aircraft carriers are 
among the military’s costliest assets. With defense budgets 
under close scrutiny, policymakers are under growing 
pressure to fully exploit military assets and to minimize 
the prospects that assets may be underutilized. 
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The thesis will focus on aircraft carriers and 
identifying an appropriate path towards the future of U.S. 
sea-based air power by studying historical case studies of 
air power integration into the war fighting capabilities of 
the fleet. It will attempt to analyze current utilization 
and effectiveness of the aircraft carrier, given its 
operational requirements with respect to identified threats 
as described in security and strategy statements. It can be 
agreed upon that the U.S. Navy requires air cover; but 
whether air cover should be sea based in the form of super 
carriers, jeep carriers, VTOL/STOVL aircraft on many 
vessels, or even land based USAF protection in littoral 
settings, is the question this thesis hopes to investigate. 
Proponents of U.S. super carriers suggest that no other 
single asset in the U.S. military arsenal can bring as much 
concentrated striking power to U.S. decisionmakers’ ability 
to respond to crises nearly anywhere in the world. The 
military advantages of aircraft carriers are obvious: They 
can quickly i.e., in days to a few weeks, move an air wing 
of about 75 aircraft (40+ strike fighters) to distant 
theaters of war; respond rapidly with precise firepower to 
changing tactical situations; support several missions at 
once, with as many as 200+ sorties per day; and deploy in 
international waters without permission of other nations.  
Despite these generally accepted certainties, a 
fundamental question arises: What does the future hold for 
sea-based air power? Aircraft carriers are among the 
military’s costliest assets. With defense budgets under an 
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unblinking lens of scrutiny, policymakers are under growing 
pressure to fully exploit all military assets and to 
minimize the prospects that assets may be underutilized.1 
Skeptics about aircraft carriers suggest that the age of the 
super carrier as we know it has reached the end of its 
lifespan - suggesting the U.S. Navy’s capital ship of choice 
has become a platform requiring critical scrutiny when 
measured against today’s threat and economic environment. 
Despite these concerns, the immediate future of U.S. carrier 
aviation continues to unfold with the development and 
procurement of the Ford (CVN-78) class CVN-21. Can other 
weapons platforms, maritime or shore-based, be more cost 
effective under a measure of effectiveness appropriate for 
the 21st century?  
The Navy’s current carrier force includes one 
conventionally powered carrier and 10 nuclear-powered 
carriers (the one-of-a-kind Enterprise CVN-65 and 9 Nimitz 
class ships, CVN-68 through CVN-76). The most recently 
commissioned carrier, the Ronald Reagan CVN-76, was procured 
in FY1995 at a cost of $4.45 billion2 and entered service in 
July 2003 as the replacement for the Constellation CV-64. 
The next carrier, the George H. W. Bush CVN-77, was procured 
in FY2001 and is scheduled to enter service in 2008 as the 
replacement for the Kitty Hawk. The Navy retired the Kennedy 
in FY2007 and thus reduced the carrier force to a planned 11 
                     
1  John Gordon et al., Leveraging America's Aircraft Carrier 
Capabilities, Exploring New Combat and Noncombat Roles and Missions for 
the U.S. Carrier Fleet (Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138: RAND Corporation, 
2006). 
2  Ronald O'Rourke, Navy CVN-21 Aircraft Carrier Program: Background 
and Issues for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service 
- The Library of Congress, 2007). 
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ships. CVN-77 is the Navy’s final Nimitz-class carrier. The 
Navy’s successor to the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier design 
is the CVN-21 design. Compared to the Nimitz-class design, 
the CVN-21 design will incorporate several incremental 
changes, including an ability to generate about 25 percent 
more aircraft sorties per day over the Nimitz class, as well 
as features permitting the ship to be operated by a crew 
that is several hundred sailors smaller, reducing life-cycle 
operating and support costs. The Navy estimates CVN-78’s 
(the first CVN-21 design class) total acquisition (i.e., 
research and development plus procurement) cost at about 
$13.7 billion.3 This figure includes about $3.2 billion in 
research and development costs and about $10.5 billion in 
procurement costs. The procurement cost figure includes 
about $2.4 billion for detailed design and nonrecurring 
engineering work for the CVN-21 class, and about $8.1 
billion for building CVN-78 itself.4 An issue for the Navy 
and Congress, is whether to continue procuring only large-
deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers like CVN-21 class 
ships, which have full load displacements of about 100,000 
tons, or whether procurement of such ships should be 
replaced by, or supplemented with, procurement of smaller 
and less expensive sea-based air platforms. Some observers 
have suggested procurement of smaller carriers such as the 
57,000-ton displacement medium-sized carrier or the 13,500-
ton displacement high-speed “pocket” carrier developed by 
the Naval Postgraduate School under an effort called the 
                     
3  Ronald O'Rourke, Navy CVN-21 Aircraft Carrier Program: Background 
and Issues for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service 
- The Library of Congress, 2007). 
4  Ibid. 
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Crossbow project,5 with its aircraft carrier referred to as 
Sea Archer.6 Crossbow was proposed by DOD’s Office of Force 
Transformation in a 2005 report to Congress on potential 
alternative Navy force architectures.7 The research will 
examine alternatives to include architecture and weapons 
platforms completely unlike the iconic large-deck aircraft 
carrier design. 
Can our super carriers provide the power projection 
response and coverage required of the many potential global 
hotspots? Are our aircraft carriers too vulnerable? Would a 
mix or combination of large-deck and a number of smaller 
carriers be able to provide more coverage, as well as reduce 
the potential sting of losing a super carrier to modern 
smart anti-ship or theater ballistic missile (MaRV) weapons?  
The research will examine the future of sea-based air 
power from a analytic perspective and aims to examine a path 
forward that best matches aircraft carrier design, 
employment, and alternatives vs. costs, risks, and 
operational requirements within the current existing 
strategic environment that includes traditional and 
asymmetric threats. Naval Aviation Vision 2020 describes the 
modern large deck aircraft carrier in these terms:  
                     
5  Ronald O'Rourke, Navy Ship Acquisition: Options for Lower-Cost 
Ship Designs - Issues for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, 2005). 
6  Faculty and Students, "SEA ARCHER Distributed Aviation Platform" 
(Master of Science, Naval Postgraduate School), ii-iii-321, www.nps.edu. 
7  Stuart E. Johnson and Arthur K. Cebrowski, Alternative Fleet 
Architechture Design (Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington D.C.: National 
Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 
2005), 
http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Def_Tech/DTP%2019%20Alternative%20Fleet%20Archi
tecture%20Design.pdf (accessed May 5, 2008). 
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The aircraft carrier is the cornerstone of naval 
aviation, in the past ten years alone, large-deck 
carriers have been called upon to respond to, and 
engage in, over 20 separate international crises, 
ranging from deterring Iraqi aggression 
(Operations Northern and Southern Watch) to 
thwarting attacks on civilians in the former 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Operation Deliberate 
Force). In OEF, carrier-based air wings flew 
strike and combat support missions against 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorist forces in 
Afghanistan. In OIF, the carriers operated 
around-the-clock, immune to hazards such as 
sandstorms that grounded land-based aircraft. 
Organic air wings provided strike, electronic 
attack, airborne early warning, ISR, and other 
combat capabilities, clearly demonstrating the 
role of the large-deck aircraft carrier as a 
permanent fixture in our national defense 
strategy.8  
Questions arise nonetheless: Is the role of the large-
deck aircraft carrier a permanent fixture in our national 
defense strategy, given the primarily asymmetric nature of 
America’s modern and predicted threats? How should the U.S. 
Navy enable sea-based air power in the face of an evolving 
non-traditional threat? Is CVN-21 the appropriate 
transformational carrier design to meet U.S. Navy 
operational air requirements for the navy after next? Would 
the U.S. CVN fleet and the National Military and Maritime 
strategy be better served with a mixture of smaller 
complementary aircraft carriers that could potentially 
provide a higher degree of flexibility and distributed 
capability in high and low intensity conflict?  When 
                     
8  James M. Zortman, Walter B. Massenburg and Kilkline, Thomas J., 
Jr, "Naval Aviation Vision 2020," Naval Aviation Enterprise, 
http://depts.washington.edu/uwnrotc/intro/Naval_Aviation_Vision_2020.pdf 
(accessed May 15, 2008). 
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considering conflicts of the past 25 years (when the U.S. 
first intervened in Lebanon), up to the present, it can be 
argued that CVN’s did not, in fact, deter factions in 
Lebanon, the Balkans, Saddam in 1990 and 2003, the Iranians, 
or Al Qaeda, despite the common assertion that CVN’s provide 
a means of deterrence to would-be adversaries. Just when 
have CVN’s had this vaunted deterrent effect?9 Are there 
cost effective and strategically viable alternatives? For 
example, might a larger number of less costly aviation-
capable amphibious assault ships with accompanying Marines 
be a viable substitute? The following three chapters will 
examine historical case studies of aircraft carrier 
employment in combat operations that include Operation 
ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and 
the Falklands War from a lens of projecting power, 
deterrence and compellance, COIN and the GWOT. The intent is 
to compile data and analysis from the case studies to 
develop a proposal for the evolution of aircraft carrier 
design strategy.  
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is a unique case due to an 
initial absence of suitable operating air bases close enough 
to the campaign area to make large-scale use of land-based 
fighter aircraft possible. Land-locked, the remoteness of 
Afghanistan presented a theater more than 400 nautical miles 
from U.S. aircraft carriers operating in the North Arabian 
Sea.10 Alongside surface ships and long range Air Force 
bombers, this is a classic case of an aircraft carrier’s 
                     
9  John Arquilla, Militaries and Technological Change, SO4104, 2007. 
10  Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, America's Conduct 
of Operation Enduring Freedom (Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138: RAND 
Corporation, 2005). 
 7
ability to arrive early to the fight while negotiations for 
forward basing arrangements could be secured for land-based 
fighter aircraft. Despite this and CAOC statistics that 
indicate U.S. carrier fighters flew three-quarters of all 
OEF sorties, the preponderance of ordnance, particularly 
precision guided munitions, were delivered by the U.S. Air 
Force. This campaign also highlights the use of SOF units 
operating with Afghan forces supported by combat aircraft. 
Despite the campaign being lauded an overwhelming success, 
most of the top Taliban leaders and key Al Qaeda figures 
survived the war and eluded capture.11 Taliban and al Qaeda 
forces proved formidable foes that air power alone could not 
have neutralized.  
The opening three weeks of high intensity combat during 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM put to the test the U.S. Navy’s 
Fleet Response Plan (FRP) of surging aircraft carriers, 
breaking lock with the established six month deployment 
rotation. Rather than forward presence, the FRP’s intent was 
to provide forward presence with a purpose.12 The U.S. Navy 
massed six carriers and demonstrated versatility by 
employing JDAM strikes in a sandstorm, and provided close 
air support for troops-in-contact. The air component kept 
the ground campaign on the offensive during needed pauses 
for logistics support or unexpected ones due to weather. It 
protected supply lines by making it all but impossible for 
                     
11  Carl Conetta, Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation 
Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Project on Defense Alternatives, 2002), 87 (accessed April 15, 2008). 
12  Ham, Walter T. IV, "'Presence with a Purpose' - CNO Explains 
Fleet Response Plan," U.S. Navy, 
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=9060 (accessed May 15, 
2008). 
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the Iraqis to mass their forces.13 Generating enough sorties 
to meet mission needs was never a problem. The six committed 
carriers and their embarked air wings could generate sorties 
faster than the CAOC could generate targets.14 Within a 
month, high intensity conflict came to an end. What followed 
was a quagmire of insurgency and internecine tribal warfare 
still under way. The issue is the role the super carrier 
plays in supporting counterinsurgency. During the past five 
years of U.S. presence in Iraq, how have carrier aircraft 
deterred insurgency? Are there more cost-effective ways to 
provide the modes and contributions made by carrier aircraft 
for stability operations? This case considers these issues 
and more. 
The Falklands War is a campaign whose success was 
achieved, in part, with two conventionally powered medium 
aircraft carriers using STOVL aircraft. Of interest, in one 
of the more significant events of the conflict, airpower 
played no part. A British attack submarine sank an Argentine 
cruiser. Airpower was, however, affected by it. This case 
exemplifies the ability of a force to successfully combat a 
numerically larger adversary with medium conventional 
carriers using STOVL aircraft. It also brings to mind the 
effects posed on an adversary that’s faced with a viable 
submarine threat.  
                     
13  Rebecca Grant, "Decisive Combat Operations" In Battle-Tested, 
Carrier Aviation in Afghanistan and Iraq (Washington DC 20002: IRIS 
Press, 2005), 149-150-173. 
14  Benjamin S. Lambeth, American Carrier Air Power at the Dawn of a 
New Century (Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138: RAND Corporation, 2005). 
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II. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 
The requirement for a credible deep-attack force 
capable of reaching the remotest part of Southwest Asia 
where the U.S. initially had no access to forward land bases 
confronted the Navy’s carrier force with a uniquely 
demanding challenge. At the time of the 9/11 attacks, the 
aircraft carriers USS George Washington (CVN-73) and John F. 
Kennedy (CV-67) were engaged in predeployment workups off 
the U.S. east coast, the John C. Stennis (CVN-74) and 
Constellation (CV-64) were similarly preparing for 
deployment off the California coast. Kitty Hawk (CV-63) was 
at dockside in her home port of Yokosuka, Japan. Enterprise 
(CVN-65) was outbound from the Southwest Asian area of 
operations off the coast of Yemen heading for home as she 
neared the end of a six-month deployment to the Persian 
Gulf. Carl Vinson (CVN-70) was inbound to CENTCOM’s AOR off 
the southern tip of India to relieve Enterprise.15 These 
ships and numerous others were ordered to their highest 
state of readiness in the immediate aftermath of the 
attacks. DoD and the carrier battle group commanders also 
initiated moves to update contingency plans for naval strike 
operations in the most likely areas of possible U.S. combat 
involvement worldwide. In a 2005 RAND report titled American 
Carrier Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century, Benjamin 
Lambeth states “the Enterprise CO turned his ship around 
upon learning of the terrorist attacks and was subsequently 
ordered to remain in the region for an indefinite length of 
                     
15  Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, America's Conduct 
of Operation Enduring Freedom, 111-411. 
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time. Carl Vinson was rerouted from her previously assigned 
operating area to join Enterprise in the North Arabian Sea. 
That doubled the normal number of carrier air wings ready 
for tasking in that portion of CENTCOM’s AOR. Theodore 
Roosevelt (CVN-71) was slated to sail from Norfolk the week 
of September 19, a week after 9/11. Once she was under way, 
the Navy would have almost half, five of its 12 carriers 
headed toward CENTCOM’s AOR simultaneously.”16 Concurrently, 
Kitty Hawk departed Yokosuka without her full air wing 
aboard to provide what later came to be referred to as a sea 
based “lily pad” from which U.S. special operations forces 
(SOF) teams would be staged into Afghanistan. By October 1, 
Carl Vinson and Enterprise were in position to commence 
strike operations, with Theodore Roosevelt expected to be 
ready to join them in the North Arabian Sea within a week. 
By this time, the overall number of U.S. aircraft in the 
region had grown to between 400 and 500, including 75 on 
each of the Navy’s three carriers on station.17  
Within less than a month after 9/11, CENTCOM organized, 
planned, and initiated a joint and combined campaign to 
bring down the Taliban theocracy that had provided bin Laden 
and his terrorist operation safe haven there since 1998. OEF 
would be characterized by air attacks against Taliban and al 
Qaeda military assets and personnel, integrated with SOF on 
the ground that worked with indigenous Afghan opposition 
groups to provide allied strike aircraft with timely target 
location, identification, and validation.  
                     
16  Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, America's Conduct 
of Operation Enduring Freedom, iii-411. 
17  Lambeth, American Carrier Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century. 
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As part of the joint force, carrier-based Navy and 
Marine Corps strike fighters operating from stations in the 
North Arabian Sea initially made up the preponderance of 
sorties in lieu of Air Force land-based fighter and attack 
aircraft because of an absence of suitable operating 
locations close enough to the war zone at the opening of 
hostilities. To be sure, aircraft carriers did not operate 
alone; Tomahawk cruise missiles, a total of fifty-three18, 
were launched from British and U.S. submarines and ships, 
U.S. Air Force bombers such as the B-1B Lancer, B-2 Spirit, 
and B-52 Stratofortress were also involved in the initial 
wave and throughout the air campaign.19 Nonetheless, the 
Navy’s carrier air wings that were committed to the campaign 
provided CENTCOM with a valiant contribution to combat 
operations throughout the war. Strike missions from the 
carriers entailed distances to target of 600 nautical miles 
or more, with an average sortie length of more than four and 
a half hours and required a minimum of two, often many more, 
in-flight refuelings each way to complete the mission.20  
There were also two amphibious ready groups built around the 
15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units and the large-deck 




                     
18  Norman Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan and America's New Way of 
War (291, Annapolis, MD 21402: US Naval Institute Press, 2003), 304. 
19  Ian C. McCaleb, "Defense Officials: Air Operation to Last 
'several Days'," CNN, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/10/07/ret.attack.pentagon/ (accessed May 
07, 2008). 
20  Lambeth, American Carrier Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century, 
52-53-58. 
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These two units would later be the principal U.S. ground 
force in southern Afghanistan, and as such would play an 
important role after the fall of the Taliban.21 
Throughout the first five days, Navy fighters dropped 
240 JDAMs and laser-guided bombs (LGBs) altogether, as well 
as one I-2000 BLU-109 hard-structure munition. A week later, 
in three consecutive days of the war’s heaviest bombing to 
date, allied aircraft attacked a dozen target sets, 
including Taliban airfields, AAA positions, armored 
vehicles, ammunition dumps, and terrorist training camps. 
Those attacks involved some 90 Navy and Marine Corps 
fighters operating from all three air wings that were by 
then on station aboard Enterprise, Carl Vinson, and Theodore 
Roosevelt. The farthest distance of 750 nautical miles from 
carrier to targets in northern Afghanistan made for sorties 
lasting, on occasion, as long as ten hours, often with 
multiple mission tasking. These missions entered the annals 
of naval aviation history as the longest-range combat 
sorties ever flown by carrier-based aircraft.22  
In effect, the initial air campaign, which concentrated 
on vital targets deep in Afghanistan, was a test of the pure 
form of network-centric theory, the idea that attacking a 
few key targets (the “center of gravity”) could and would be 
decisive. It failed. The effects of the first weeks of the 
air campaign were limited, at best. The Taliban did not 
                     
21  Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan and America's New Way of War, 
304. 
22  Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, America's Conduct of Operation 
Enduring Freedom, iii-411. 
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collapse instantly.23 In a 2002 Project on Defense 
Alternatives monograph by Carl Conetta titled Strange 
Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom 
and the Afghanistan War, the author states “through the end 
of October the air campaign did not either compel Taliban 
cooperation or disintegrate the movement. During most of 
this period air attacks focused largely on air defense, 
command and control, political, and infrastructure targets 
as well as military bases and storage sites. What could have 
been drawn from the experience of Operation Allied Force was 
that the lever of air power requires a fulcrum on the 
ground.”24 
The available ground fulcrum in Afghanistan, the 
Northern Alliance, was regarded initially as unlikely to 
produce the desired political outcome, should it sweep to 
victory. Thus, support for the Alliance’s war effort was 
minimally configured to sustain their front and pressure the 
Taliban without enabling a rapid Alliance sweep. Of course, 
the only completely reliable fulcrum would have been U.S. 
and coalition troops on the ground in larger numbers. But 
practical and diplomatic problems precluded this option, at 
least in the chosen time frame. Conetta adds,  
for its part, the Northern Alliance, probably 
following Russian advice, was reluctant to risk 
its troops, assets, and power in vigorously 
attacking well-defended Taliban positions, unless 
the United States provided more visible support. 
The mid-October shortcomings of the Northern 
Alliance’s first attempt to take Mazar-i-Sharif 
exemplified the stalemate in the north. This and 
                     
23  Conetta, Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation 
Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan War, 87. 
24  Ibid., 87, 15. 
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the apparent resilience of the Taliban elsewhere 
prompted a process of questioning and re-
orienting America’s strategy.25 
 Nonetheless, the administration’s initial response to 
the difficulties during the second week of war was not to 
unleash the Alliance but to increase the intensity of 
bombing all around. This also increased the rate of civilian 
casualties and elicited a new round of international 
criticism. Essentially, the war effort became a race between 
the cumulative effects of bombing and the international 
disapprobation that this incurred. Still, through the end of 
October, the air campaign was no more effective than a lever 
without a fulcrum. However, when a second element, a more 
substantial force on the ground was added, the strategy 
proved successful. Thus the Northern Alliance coalition 
troops made victory in much of Afghanistan possible-when 
they were combined with a network-centric strike campaign. 
The glue holding together the Northern Alliance and U.S. 
strike force was small A-Teams (ODA) of U.S. Special 
Operations Forces, integrated with Air Force enlisted 
tactical air controllers (ETACs) or combat controllers 
(CCTs), and CIA operatives. For Northern Alliance 
commanders, these teams were the visible face of U.S. 
commitment to the war. Without them, the bombers would have 
been blind to the most important targets.26 It showed that 
the U.S. was willing to risk its own personnel in support of 
the Northern Alliance. The significance of the later Marine 
                     
25  Conetta, Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation 
Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan War, 87, 16. 
26  Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan and America's New Way of War, 
304. 
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Corps occupation of Forward Operating Base Rhino was 
similar. Demonstrating a U.S. commitment to the war helped 
convince Afghans to fight alongside the United States. No 
remote attack could be expected to have the same effect.  
The first phase of the bombing in OEF ended on December 
18. The week that followed was the first since the war began 
on October 7 in which no bombs were dropped, although 
numerous armed F-14s, F/A-18s, B-52s, and B-1s continued to 
orbit on call over Kandahar and Tora Bora to attack any 
possible al Qaeda targets that might emerge. Those aircraft 
were joined by Italian Navy Harriers operating off the 
carrier Garibaldi and the French Super Etendard fighters 
from the carrier Charles de Gaulle. By mid-January 2002, 
offensive air operations over Afghanistan had largely been 
reduced to a trickle, and only one in ten strike sorties 
dropped munitions.27 Those on the ground did not always need 
air support, but they did have to be sure that it would be 
available whenever it was needed. Thus, often aircraft did 
return to their bases or carriers with weapons still 
onboard.28 
Two months after the rout of the Taliban and the 
installation of the interim successor government of Hamid 
Karzai, U.S. forces met their single greatest challenge of 
the war in an initiative that came to be known as Operation 
Anaconda. The Shah-i-Kot valley area in eastern Afghanistan 
near the Pakistani border had been under surveillance by 
CENTCOM ever since early January 2002, prompted by 
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intelligence reports that the Taliban and al Qaeda forces 
were regrouping there in an area near the town of Gardez. 
Over time, enemy forces continued to mass in the area, to a 
point where it appeared as though they might begin to pose a 
serious threat to the Karzai government. At that point, the 
U.S. Army’s Combined Joint Task Force Mountain began 
planning an operation aimed at surrounding the Shah-i-Kot 
valley with overlapping rings of U.S. and indigenous Afghan 
forces, the intent being to bottle up and capture or kill 
the several hundred al Qaeda fighters who were thought to 
have congregated in the area. Approximately 150-200 fighters 
were believed to be wintering and possibly preparing for a 
spring offensive in the valley. The signal intelligence also 
raised the possibility that high-value targets (HVTs) were 
present in the valley. These HVTs were believed to be Osama 
bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mullah Omar, the leaders of 
al-Qaida and the Taliban, respectively. In late January and 
February plans were drawn up to assault the Shah-i-Kot 
Valley using Afghan military forces (AMF) advised and 
assisted by U.S. special operators. The plan called for an 
attack on the valley, along with units positioned in the 
mountains to the east to prevent escape into Pakistan. U.S. 
conventional infantry would be utilized, consisting of the 
3rd Brigade ("Rakkasans") of the 101st Airborne Division, 
and 1st Battalion, 87th Regiment (1-87) of the 10th Mountain 
Division to secure these blocking positions. In keeping with 
established strategy in Afghanistan, fire support was to be 
provided by USAF and carrier aircraft, rather than 
artillery.  
The amount of conventional assets allowed in 
Afghanistan was limited by CENTCOM and civilian defense 
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leadership.29 The final plan foresaw two major forces: TF 
Hammer and TF Anvil. TF Hammer consisted of AMF and special 
operators as the primary effort to assault the Shah-i-Kot 
Valley. TF Anvil consisted of TF Rakkasan and the 1-87 to 
set up blocking positions and prevent enemy forces from 
escaping. Special operations teams from the Advanced Force 
Operations (AFO) detachment were to provide on-location 
reconnaissance in the Shah-i-Kot Valley for the operation.  
Carrier Air Wing (CVW) NINE aboard John C. Stennis, 
which had taken up station in the Afghan war zone in mid-
December 2001, played a major part in Operation Anaconda, as 
did CVW-7 on John F. Kennedy. Along with strike fighter 
missions, E-2C Hawkeyes provided airborne command and 
control inside Afghanistan, and EA-6Bs provided 24-hour 
alert jamming support for CJTF Mountain. By the end of the 
first week of Anaconda fighting, against a more formidable 
enemy than expected, allied air attacks, in support of the 
embattled ground troops, became more consistent and 
sustained. Al Qaeda and Taliban strategy veered towards 
fleeing, many of which escaped into neighboring areas, 
allowing friendly forces to seize control of more terrain. 
Carrier-based F-14s and F/A-18s contributed significantly to 
this support. In addition, 16 Super Etendards from the 
French Navy’s carrier Charles de Gaulle took part in 
Anaconda by providing close air support, along with French 
Mirage 2000Ds operating out of Manas airfield in Kyrgyzstan. 
The intelligence estimate of al Qaeda fighters for 
Operation ANACONDA was incorrect, and varied from a few 
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hundred to a few thousand. The operation was considered to 
be purely within the Army’s purview and apparently was not 
coordinated adequately with the coalition’s air component; 
the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) was not made aware 
of the operation until after the generation of the OPORD 
(operation order)30, just before it was to begin.31 There was 
a divergence between Army and Air Force concepts of 
operations. The Army veered towards combined arms operating 
tactically, that is, as a force moves into contact with the 
enemy, Army aircraft (helicopters) operate in close support, 
under control of a ground commander. The favored Air Force 
operating technique is preparation of the battle space by 
pre-battle bombardment. In this case, pre-battle bombardment 
was rejected on the grounds that it would sacrifice the 
element of surprise. As it was, there was no surprise at 
all.32  And as such, the air component was not appropriately 
incorporated into the Operation ANACONDA planning until very 
close to execution. The effort began to unravel almost from 
the March 2, 2002, start, as three elements of the 
encircling coalition forces ran into unexpectedly tough 
resistance. The following day, U.S. aircraft dropped 270 
bombs on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. Nonetheless, 
conditions deteriorated, as al Qaeda was on familiar turf 
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and had ample supplies of weapons and munitions. On March 4, 
the day the battle was to have been concluded, an attempt 
was made to insert troops by helicopters near a point in the 
mountains called Takur Ghar. This appeared to be a perfect 
location for an observation post; unfortunately, the point 
was under observation of al Qaeda fighters positioned in a 
well-concealed bunker system just over the ridge. The troop 
insertion was rebuffed with heavy fire and resulted in a 
friendly casualty. Two other attempts to land helicopters 
also faced heavy fire and resulted in casualties with a 
rescue situation at hand. The rescue effort came with two 
MH-47Es and a twenty-three man Ranger quick reaction force 
moving into the same hot spot near Takur Ghar. Al Qaeda 
forces were waiting, one MH-47E was shot down by a RPG as it 
attempted to land near the site. Four men were killed at 
once and others wounded. The rangers deployed to attack the 
al Qaeda bunkers, calling for air support. Air Force 
aircraft arrived within minutes to bomb and strafe the 
bunker area. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles were called in to 
strafe the al Qaeda positions at the top of the ridgeline, 
an area only a few yards from coalition lines and provided 
CAS for several hours.  
By the time the battle of Takur Ghar ended, eight men 
had died. Later in the operation, air support expanded to 
include B-1B, B-2A, F-15, AC-130, A-10, B-52, F/A-18 and 
Apache helicopters. In Battle-Tested: Carrier Aviation in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, Rebecca Grant states “in this crisis 
it was the two carriers off Pakistan that provided the bulk 
of the fighter sorties – an average of about 32 strike 
sorties per day penetrating deep into eastern 
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Afghanistan,”33 and that, “bombs available outnumbered 
targets…with the carriers providing an average of over 30 
sorties per day, the CAOC was always ‘excess to need’ in 
terms of sorties available.”34 More than 2,000 bombs were 
dropped on al Qaeda positions from B-52s and F/A-18s. What 
had been planned as a seventy-two hour operation lasted 
another fourteen days before the remnants of the dug-in 
enemy either were killed or managed to escape.35 Operation 
ANACONDA turned out to be an acid test of land and air 
component cooperation in a pitched fight. The al-Qaeda and 
Taliban forces holed up in prepared defensive positions in 
the 10,000-foot mountains and rained mortars and small arms 
fire down on the soldiers, sailors, and airmen holding 
blocking positions below. Over the next two weeks, bombers, 
fighters, helicopters and AC-130 gunships delivered close 
air support (CAS) into the postage-stamp size battle area 
measuring about 8 nautical miles (nm) x 8 nm. De-confliction 
and coordination of this “fire support” proved challenging 
with friendly troops and controllers in a small area. In the 
air, funneling the strikes in was just as intense, and 
strike aircraft reported several near misses as one pulled 
up from an attack run while another rolled onto the target. 
After initial contact sparked heavy fighting, air 
controllers attached to ground forces or airborne FAC-A’s 
called in airpower to provide close air support.  
Grant states that “one of the biggest challenges was  
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preventing mid-air collisions…and with a steady supply of 
strike aircraft…directing combat aircraft was still the 
limiting factor.”36 
From the start of hostilities on October 7, 2001, until 
the period of major combat that ended in mid March of 2002, 
six carrier battle groups participated in OEF. Together, 
they conducted around-the-clock combat operations against 
enemy forces in a landlocked country more than an hour and a 
half’s flight north of the carrier operating areas in the 
Arabian Sea. Those operating areas were repositioned from 
time to time to meet changing tactical requirements. Lambeth 
indicates, “eventually, however, carrier-launched air 
missions came to average a distance of 600 nautical miles 
from their stations some 100-120 nautical miles south of the 
Pakistani coast to central Afghanistan and another 150-200 
nautical miles to northern Afghanistan.”37 Throughout the 
war, the Navy maintained at least two carriers on station in 
the North Arabian Sea. “When Theodore Roosevelt arrived on 
station on October 17, 2001, to relieve Enterprise, 
CENTCOM’s CFACC had three carrier air wings available to him 
for nearly a week. The number of carriers deployed to the 
AOR did not drop to one until John C. Stennis departed for 
home on April 18, 2002.”38  
“Throughout the war, carrier-based strike assets in all 
participating air wings averaged forty actual shooter 
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(delivered ordnance) sorties a day per carrier.”39 The 
remaining sorties that made up the daily baseline of 90 per 
air wing entailed tanker, electronic warfare, command and 
control, and other mission support.40 After the war ended, 
“one-third of all Navy strike sorties had been directed 
against interdiction targets with the remaining two-thirds 
providing air support to friendly ground forces. Around 80 
percent of the carrier-based missions that dropped ordnance 
did so against targets that were unknown to the aircrew 
before launch,”41 of which the key to execution of the 
mission rested on aircrew connecting with the network on the 
ground. “Of the Navy sorties that delivered ordnance, 84 
percent were assessed as having hit at least one target and 
an average of two desired mean points of impact (DMPI) were 
hit by Navy sorties that dropped ordnance. Of all Navy 
munitions dropped, 93 percent were either satellite-aided or 
laser-guided. Targets were attacked at all hours of the day 
by navy strike fighters, with most weapon impacts occurring 
during the first three hours of daylight.”42  
Each carrier conducted flight operations for roughly 
14-16 hours a day, with overlaps as needed to keep an 
average of three two-plane section of fighters constantly 
over Afghanistan for on-call strikes against emerging 
targets. Of all missions flown, 25 percent lasted longer 
than five and a half hours, with some F/A-18 missions 
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lasting up to ten hours. The extensive distance between the 
carrier operating area and target area made for an operating 
environment that was extremely unforgiving. Aircrews would 
occasionally find themselves in a “tank or die” situation, 
with tanker hook-ups occurring after an aircraft’s fuel 
state had fallen so low that the aircraft would not have 
been able to make it to Pakistan in the event that the 
tanker had gone “sour” (unavailable).43  
As indicated by statistics compiled by the CAOC 
(Combined Air Operations Center of USCENTAF, the air enabler 
of CENTCOM) during the 76 days of bombing between October 7, 
when OEF began, and December 23, when the first phase of the 
war ended after the collapse of the Taliban, some 6,500 
strike sorties were flown by CENTCOM forces altogether, out 
of which approximately 17,500 munitions were dropped on more 
than 120 fixed targets, 400 vehicles and artillery pieces, 
and a profusion of concentrations of Taliban and al Qaeda 
combatants. Of the total number of allied munitions 
expended, 57 percent were precision-guided munitions. “U.S. 
carrier-based strike fighters accounted for 4,900 of the 
6,500 strike sorties flown, making up 75 percent of the 
total sorties during that period, but delivered less than 30 
percent of the ordnance. USAF flew 25 percent of the strike 
sorties but delivered over 70 percent of the ordnance.”44 
Maritime forces accounted for more than half of all 
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precision munitions expended.45 To be sure, Air Force heavy 
bombers played a prominent part in OEF, by flying from the 
British island base of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and, 
in the case of the B2 stealth bomber (which flew six 
missions against the air defenses of the ruling Taliban 
during the campaign’s first two nights), all the way from 
Whiteman AFB, Missouri, and back. Air Force bombers dropped 
nearly three-quarters of all the satellite aided GBU-31 
joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs) that were delivered 
throughout the war. Air Force F-15E and F-16 fighters also 
contributed materially to strike operations after the tenth 
day. “For its part, although the Air Force flew only a 
quarter of the strike missions, its aircraft dropped 12,900 
munitions, more than 70 percent of the total. The heavy B-
52’s and B-1’s flew only 10 percent of the total strike 
missions, yet they delivered 11,500 of the 17,500 of the 
munitions, accounting for 65 percent of the total and 89 
percent of all the munitions dropped by the Air Force.”46 
“As many in the naval aviation community were among the 
first to acknowledge, without nonorganic Air Force and RAF 
tankers to provide inflight refueling support, the Navy’s 
carrier air wings could not have participated in OEF beyond 
the southernmost target areas in Afghanistan.”47 Of 
particular interest, was the coupling of naval air 
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capabilities with SOF, for example, Navy F-14s transmitted 
and received imagery from allied SOF units on the ground 
using the aircraft’s Fast Tactical Imagery (FTI). That 
system coupled the fighters for the first time with SOF 
teams deployed with Northern Alliance forces around Kabul. 
The SOF teams communicated with F-14 crews via laptop 
computers. FTI provided a day and night standoff 
transmission system enabling F-14 crews to send and receive 
imagery to and from SOF units, thus giving the aircraft a 
near real time two-way imagery capability. Imagery from the 
ground could be sent back to the carrier for either 
clearance to attack, if needed, or for almost instant post 
strike battle-damage assessment. Joint coordination allowed 
SOF units to provide fine-resolution target imagery to the 
F-14s. Such use of the F-14s FTI by U.S. SOF teams on the 
ground allowed for a substantial shortening of what was 
informally called the kill chain. In addition to the above, 
the use of the Kitty Hawk as a staging base for SOF 
helicopters demonstrated versatility of the ship by 
showcasing its potential for performing missions other than 
launching fixed wing aircraft.48  
A. OEF ANALYSIS 
Could alternative forms of sea-based air power 
substitute the combat effects provided by CVN’s?  Kitty Hawk 
demonstrated versatility performing as a “lily pad” for SOF 
units. Other sea based platforms, such as amphibious ships, 
could have performed that function equally as well. A CVN is 
not needed to perform this mission. Although ingenious in 
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flexibility, this is an issue of its intended utilization. 
Its astute to have innovatively used this ship to deliver 
SOF ashore, but to use this instance in asset flexibility as 
an example and means to justify further procurement of 
large-deck carriers in the future leaves doubt as to whether 
this is the most efficient use of its utilization. In a 2006 
RAND report that explores new combat and non-combat roles 
and missions for U.S. carriers, the authors cite this case 
as an example of flexibility of a CV to function as a SOF 
insertion platform into Afghanistan.49 The report also 
states “the need for flexibility requires a more modular 
approach. Current ships could be reconfigured, but at some 
cost, to increase their ability…future ships, particularly 
the soon-to-be-built CVN-21, could be modified while still 
in the design phase to increase their ability to switch 
missions and aircraft types,”50 the report continues by 
making a subtle, but important note in stating that “the 
concept of increased modularity and flexibility for current 
and future U.S. Navy aircraft carriers could also be applied 
to the next large amphibious ships – the LHA-R class…,”51 
this is an option that should be considered, it would 
provide for more distribution and tailoring of the sea-based 
air package to a permutating combat situation.  
Ships such as the new USS San Antonio class LPD-17 
conduct amphibious assault, special operations, and 
expeditionary warfare operations in support of the war on 
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terrorism.52  An LPD can launch or land up to four CH-46 Sea 
Knight helicopters; or up to two MV-22 Osprey tilt rotor 
aircraft simultaneously with room to spot four MV-22s on 
deck and one in the hangar. Wasp class LHD’s are capable of 
providing aircraft to support SOF and troops in contact in 
an OEF type scenario as well. A typical complement of 
aircraft on an LHD is a mix of 25 helicopters and six to 
eight AV-8B Harriers. In a secondary sea control role the 
most likely mix is 20 AV-8B Harriers and four to six SH-60B 
Seahawk and MH-60S Knighthawk helicopters.53 At full load an 
LHD displaces 41,000 tons. In the future these ships will 
support the MV-22 Osprey and the STOVL F-35B strike fighter 
aircraft. The emphasis associated with these missions is to 
land elements of a Marine landing force in amphibious 
assault operations; they are, nonetheless, more than capable 
in participating in the joint & coalition arena in support 
of Marines, SOF and conventional forces on the ground. This 
is an untapped capability well worth utilizing much more 
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of the LHD/LHA/LPD type, with USS Makin Island (LHD 8) under 
construction54, and seven more LPD’s slated to be 
constructed.55 
To date, CTOL aircraft have proven to be the most 
capable assets of carrier air wings. V/STOL aircraft, such 
as the AV-8B Harrier, are considered inferior in terms of 
endurance, fighter/attack capability and carry capacity. The 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), now in advanced development for 
the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Royal Navy, may represent a 
giant step in erasing the advantages of the CTOL fighter. 
Taking full advantage of numerous developments in structural 
materials, engine and airframe design, and low-observable 
attributes, the JSF and future derivatives may eventually 
permit the use of smaller carrier platforms to perform many 
or even all of the missions assigned to present-day large-
deck carriers.56 The F-35B (V/STOL version) is a fifth 
generation fighter/attack platform being developed to be the 
world's premier strike aircraft through 2040. It is intended 
that its air-to-air capability will be second only to that 
of the F-22 Raptor. Specifically, the F-35’s requirements 
are that it be: four times more effective than legacy 
fighters in air-to-air combat, eight times more effective in 
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air-to-ground battle combat, and three times more effective 
in reconnaissance and suppression of enemy air defenses. 
These capabilities are to be achieved while still having 
significantly better range and a smaller logistical 
footprint than their legacy counterparts.57 The F-35 stands 
to significantly improve the combat striking power of 
amphibious ships thus making them a potential viable 
substitute to the costlier super carrier. These ships could 
be configured to conduct such operations similar to that 
seen in OEF, supported by long range bombers, if required. 
V/STOL, particularly the JSF, have reached a level of 
maturity that warrants serious reconsideration for the need 
of solely CTOL and large-deck CVNs. 
Indeed, carriers provided air bases for strike aircraft 
while negotiations for the use of land-based aircraft 
delayed their initial participation in the campaign. 
Aircraft carriers mitigated this logistical and political 
problem and provided the strike-fighters, and thus validated 
one of its principal missions. Despite this, U.S. based long 
range strategic bombers, along with additional strategic and 
tactical aircraft near or within the theater, did arrive in 
as quickly as it might have taken an aircraft carrier, 
possibly sooner, thus the campaign would not have been 
significantly delayed or undermined had a smaller 
conventional carrier required a negligible amount of 
additional time to arrive on station. Therefore, it is 
possible to suggest that OEF could have been conducted 
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without super carriers, although, it may have prolonged 
achieving the desired combat effects, due to the potentially 
smaller number of sorties generated by a smaller deck and 
air wing. A note regarding overhead air combat coverage in 
support of troops on the ground is that, when “kill boxes” 
are established, a high number of sorties are required to 
provide the persistent coverage necessary for support of 
ground troops in order to prosecute time-sensitive pop-up 
mobile and fleeing targets, that, due to its sortie 
generation capability, a large deck CVN can provide.  In 
this case, the generation of sorties in support of the 
campaign was never an issue; difficulty arose as a result of 
disconnected planning by the land and air components during 
Operation ANACONDA. Throughout the war, carrier-based strike 
aircraft in all participating air wings averaged around 40 
sorties a day that delivered ordnance per carrier.58 CVNs 
could have been substituted for this. The benefits of 
distributed capability, flexibility and the potential for 
reduced procurement and operating costs of a medium or light 
carrier make it well worth consideration. Another 
significant factor is post hostility operations, the high 
intensity portion of this campaign lasted three weeks; sea-
based air power coverage for this phase should be covered by 
an air capable ship that is better suited for low to medium 
intensity operations in support of ground forces that 
compliments their indigenous air and UAV assets.  
The National Maritime Strategy of the U.S. titled A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower states 
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maritime forces are to be “globally distributed mission-
tailored maritime forces. The Sea Services will establish a 
persistent global presence using distributed forces that are 
organized by mission and comprised of integrated Navy, 
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard capabilities. This global 
distribution must extend beyond traditional deployment areas 
and reflect missions ranging from humanitarian operations to 
an increased emphasis on counter-terrorism and irregular 
warfare. Our maritime forces will be tailored to meet the 
unique and evolving requirements particular to each 
geographic region, often in conjunction with special 
operations forces and other interagency partners. In 
particular, this strategy recognizes the rising importance 
and need for increased peacetime activities in Africa and 
the Western Hemisphere.”59 By these standards, with a view 
to a broader global presence, it makes sense for sea-based 
airpower to evolve and be procured for maximum distribution 
and flexibility in the form of medium and/or light carriers 
complementing super carriers, as required.  
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III. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM  
In the run-up to combat operations, the complex 
maneuvering to position America’s carrier fleet are 
described by Benjamin Lambeth in Combat Pair: The evolution 
of Air Force-Navy Integration in Strike Warfare,60 “in 
January 2003, in one of the first major deployment moves for 
the impending war, the Secretary of Defense ordered the USS 
Abraham Lincoln carrier battle group to redeploy to the 
North Arabian Gulf from its holding area near Australia. The 
group was en route home from a six-month deployment in the 
Middle East but was directed to remain in CENTCOM’s area of 
responsibility (AOR) as a contingency measure. The Theodore 
Roosevelt battle group, just completing a predeployment 
work-up in the Caribbean, was fresh to the fight and 
received orders to move as quickly as possible to reinforce 
Constellation, already in the Gulf, and Harry S Truman in 
the eastern Mediterranean, for possible operations against 
Iraq. A fifth carrier battle group led by USS Carl Vinson 
moved into the Western Pacific to complement two dozen Air 
Force heavy bombers that had been forward-deployed to 
Guam.”61 The author continues describing the build-up, “Air 
Force F-15Es were sent to Japan and Korea as backfills to 
cover Northeast Asia as USS Kitty Hawk moved from the 
Western Pacific to the North Arabian Gulf. In addition, the 
USS Nimitz battle group received deployment orders and got 
under way from San Diego in mid-January to wrap up an 
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already compressed three-week training exercise, after which 
it headed for the Western Pacific. Finally, the USS George 
Washington battle group, which had just returned to the East 
Coast in December following a six-month deployment in 
support of Operation Southern Watch, was placed on 96-hour 
standby alert, ready to return to Southwest Asia if 
required.”62  
In a 2005 RAND monograph, American Carrier Air Power at 
the Dawn of a New Century,63 Lambeth further describes 
prepositioning of American forces, “by the end of the first 
week of March, the Navy had two carriers, Theodore Roosevelt 
and Harry S Truman, on station in the eastern Mediterranean 
and three more carriers, Kitty Hawk, Constellation, and 
Abraham Lincoln deployed in the North Arabian Gulf along 
with their embarked air wings, each of which included around 
50 strike fighters. In addition, Nimitz was en route to the 
Gulf to relieve Abraham Lincoln, which had been on 
deployment for an unprecedented nine months.”64 The five 
carrier battle groups in position and ready for combat also 
included upward of 40 allied surface vessels and submarines 
armed with Tactical Land Attack Missiles (TLAM). In 
addition, Air Force F-15Es, F-16s, and F-117s were in place 
at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, tankers and various ISR 
platforms were forward-deployed to Prince Sultan Air Base, 
Saudi Arabia, and more than 200 additional Air Force 
aircraft, including F-15s and F-16s, were positioned at two 
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bases in Kuwait, with still more in Turkey, Oman, and the 
United Arab Emirates, all ready to carry out a 
multidirectional air attack. This fielded inventory of 
aircraft included 14 B-52s operating out of RAF Fairford in 
the United Kingdom and B-1 and B-2 bombers deployed to the 
Gulf region and Diego Garcia. Four of the B-2s that would 
take part in the war were deployed from Whiteman AFB to 
Diego Garcia. Of the F/A-18 contingent that was committed to 
the impending campaign, 60 were Marine Corps Hornets 
attached to the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing and operating out 
of land bases in the region in anticipated support of the 
1st Marine Expeditionary Force, in all, more than 700 Navy 
and Marine Corps, aircraft, roughly 40 percent, figured in 
the total of 1,800 allied aircraft altogether that were 
committed to the major combat phase of Iraqi Freedom. That 
number included 236 (15 percent) Navy and carrier-based 
Marine Corps F/A-18s, 56 F-14s, 35 EA-6Bs, 40 S-3s, and 20 
E-2Cs. The Marine Corps also provided another 130 land-based 
fighters and 22 KC-130 tankers. Those combined assets 
contributed to a coalition total of 1,801 aircraft, 863 of 
which were provided by the Air Force, 47.9%.65 
A late-breaking development that threatened to impair 
the effective conduct of impending air operations, 
especially by the two Navy carrier air wings on station in 
the eastern Mediterranean, was Turkey’s last-minute denial 
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of the use of its airspace by coalition forces.66 Lambeth 
describes the implications that occurred because of this, 
“airspace denial promised to complicate strike operations 
since the carrier-based aircrews in the eastern 
Mediterranean had planned to transit Turkish airspace en 
route to targets in northern Iraq, with Air Force tankers 
supporting them out of Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base. The Navy 
also had planned to fire TLAMs through Turkish airspace into 
Iraq. Without access to that airspace, one alternative would 
have been to reroute the carrier-based strike aircraft and 
TLAMs into Iraq from the west through Israeli and Jordanian 
airspace, which also would have made for an even shorter 
route than transiting Turkey’s airspace. Some Bush 
administration officials pressed hard for the use of Israeli 
airspace if Turkey continued to balk on the issue. The 
Secretary of Defense, however, backed by his senior military 
advisers both in the Pentagon and at CENTCOM, concluded that 
attacking along a course that crossed the Jewish state would 
be too politically risky.”67 The author further describes 
the high-level deliberations that ensued, “alternatively, 
were Turkey’s denial of needed access to persist, the two 
carriers in the eastern Mediterranean could redeploy through 
the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, with the result that they 
would be forced to launch aircraft several hundred miles 
farther away from Iraq. The land-based tankers slated to 
support them would have to operate from even more distant 
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shore bases. As matters turned out, the aircraft of CVW-3 
embarked on Harry S Truman and those of CVW-8 on Theodore 
Roosevelt could not participate in strike operations against 
Iraq for the first two days of the war because they lacked 
permission to transit the airspace of any of the countries 
between the carrier operating areas and their likely targets 
in Iraq.”68 Once Turkish airspace was made available to the 
coalition by D+3, however, numerous carrier-based strike 
sorties were finally flown over Turkey and, along with 
allied SOF teams on the ground, contributed to the early 
surrender of Iraqi army units fielded in the north. 
Out of a total of 41,404 coalition sorties flown 
altogether during the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft operating from 
carriers and large-deck amphibious ships flew nearly 14,000, 
33.8 percent. Of those, 5,568 were fighter sorties, 13.4 
percent, 2,058 were tanker sorties, 442 were E-2C sorties, 
and 357 were ISR sorties. Navy assets flew 25 percent of the 
theater-wide ISR sorties during the three-week period of 
major combat.69 The six carrier battle groups that 
participated directly in OIF were the core of a larger U.S. 
naval presence in the war zone that included three 
amphibious ready groups and two amphibious task forces 
totaling nearly 180 U.S. and allied ships, 80,800 sailors, 
and another 15,500 Marines.70  
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During Operation Iraqi Freedom, two LHDs served as 
“Harrier carriers,” each launching an air group of AV-8B 
attack aircraft against targets inside Iraq.71 One of these 
LHDs was the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6); it played two 
significant roles in Operation Iraqi Freedom. First, it 
offloaded more than 1,000 Marines and gear from the 3rd 
Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment into Kuwait. Then, it took up 
position just miles off the coast of Kuwait and became one 
of two Harrier carriers in the Arabian Gulf – launching AV-
8B Harrier strike aircraft into Iraq. Pilots from Marine 
Attack Squadrons 211 and 311, embarked aboard the ship, 
expended more than 175,000 pounds of ordnance, providing 
close air support to the Marines on the ground and during 
predetermined strikes in Iraq. During OIF the Bonhomme 
Richard launched more than 800 sorties, including 547 combat 
launches.72 The other “Harrier carrier” was the USS Bataan 
(LHD 5); from January to June 2003, the ship flew up to 26 
AV-8B's off her deck, directly contributing to the 
destruction of hundreds of military targets within Iraq.73 
The scope of the air war had five primary mission 
goals: 
1. Air dominance – air superiority with SEAD, DEAD 
and DCA. 
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2. Strategic attack – A-Day, distributed throughout 
the country, delivered air and missile attacks on March 21, 
@2100, concentrated on significant targets. A-Day’s combined 
attacks surged to over 2500 total sorties. 
3. The West fight – counter-Scud efforts, a 
presidential tasking. 
4. The North fight – helping SOF teams engage Iraqi 
forces north of Baghdad. 
5. The South fight – support for the CFLCC’s V Corps 
and I MEF. The south fight ultimately came to dominate 
sortie allocation and it drove requirements for carriers in 
the Persian Gulf.74 
Generating enough sorties to meet mission needs was 
never a problem. The six committed carriers and their 
embarked air wings could generate sorties faster than the 
CAOC could generate targets. The highlights of the carrier 
contribution are outlined by Lambeth, “the embarked air 
wings surged for 16-hour flying days for 23 days straight. 
Carrier air employment in Iraqi Freedom mainly featured two-
cycle operations. FAC-A and reconnaissance sorties, however, 
were typically three- and four-cycle operations because of 
their longer duration. For the most part, the war featured 
larger strike packages and shorter-duration sorties for the 
Navy than did OEF, real-time targeting and precision strikes 
reached an unprecedented high in both numbers and intensity. 
More than 800 targets were attacked within the time-
sensitive targeting process, with an average of 3.5 hours 
from target nomination to ordnance on target. More than 78 
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percent of the Navy’s strike sorties received their 
assignments in flight. Navy FAC-As provided 24-hour-a-day 
on-station service over southern Iraq and 16-hour-a-day 
service in the north. Strike-fighter operations also 
featured unprecedented flexibility in the selective use of 
satellite-aided JDAMs or LGBs, depending on assessed 
targeting needs. Of the 5,300 bombs dropped by Navy strike 
aircraft, fewer than 230 were unguided. More than 75 percent 
of the precision weapons delivered by Navy strike aircraft 
were JDAMs. Carrier air operations over northern Iraq were 
similar to those that largely predominated in OEF, in that 
they entailed a continuous airborne presence with weapons, 
with friendly SOF units closely intermingled with the enemy 
and with ordnance bring-back a matter of course. Operations 
in the south, in contrast, entailed more classic carrier air 
wing strike missions in a target-rich environment and with a 
clearer separation of friendly and enemy forces on the 
ground.”75  
A. OIF ANALYSIS 
The constraint to carrier strike operations at sea due 
to negation of Turkey’s airspace posed an ironic turn of 
events for the two carriers based in the eastern 
Mediterranean. Despite the vast freedom of maneuver ships 
possess at sea, even they can experience obstacles 
associated with host nation negotiations.  
In a July 2003 testimony on Iraq to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
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described the formula for the success of high intensity 
operations, “OIF demonstrated that overmatching power is 
more important than overwhelming force. In the past, under a 
doctrine of overwhelming force, force tended to be measured 
in terms of mass - the number of troops that were committed 
to a particular conflict. In the future, mass may no longer 
be the best measure of power in a conflict. When Baghdad 
fell, there were just over 100,000 American forces on the 
ground. Enemy forces were overwhelmed not with the typical 
advantage in mass, but by overmatching the enemy with 
advanced capabilities, and using those capabilities in 
innovative ways: speed, jointness, intelligence and 
precision were key enablers.”76 OIF demonstrated the 
preferred way to fight a war, regardless of the skill of the 
opponent. The formula included almost complete information 
dominance through C4ISR, and complete air dominance, 
including loitering platforms equipped with precision guided 
munitions (PGMs), with both of these used in combination 
with swift-moving powerful land forces. This was a one-two-
three punch that the Iraqis could not withstand.77 OIF 
marked new tactical directions for carrier aviation, the 
application of air power followed two paths, one of which is 
support for the ground troops in the form of CAS with more 
precision disabling of mechanized forces and a higher degree 
of precision against interdiction points. The other aspect 
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was trying to get down to the smallest number of targets 
possible to have the strategic effect.78 
Keeping on balance, the first lesson each of the 
services sought to impress upon themselves was that the 
“triumph” in Iraq should not go to their heads and that 
future wars would almost undoubtedly be more difficult and 
costly; consider the continuing effort today in both OEF & 
OIF. The conflict with Iraq engaged an enemy who had 
virtually no military capabilities left after an air war of 
attrition lasting over twelve years. Consequently, the 
conventional phase of the conflict was lopsided and brief. 
Carrier and amphib aviation flew nearly one-third of all 
coalition sorties, of which 13.4 percent were fighter 
sorties, against an enemy that “just melted away.”79 The 
aftermath, however, is proving far more difficult, and in 
this phase of the conflict the capability to bear massive 
air power is less relevant. The ability of strike aircraft 
to hit a number of targets with precision does represent a 
significant step forward in technological capabilities; and 
once air supremacy is achieved, these capabilities allow the 
projection of almost unlimited firepower against specific 
targets of value to the enemy. Nevertheless, an observation 
by the authors of The Iraq War: A Military History makes an 
important point; “unless advances in air power are coupled 
with intelligent thinking - by planners on the ground - 
about the nature of one’s opponent and of wars and their 
aftermath, these improved technologies will ensure only that 
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political and military defeats will come later, and at 
greater costs.”80 The demand for the sortie generating 
capacity and firepower of a super carrier has diminished 
following the initial high-intensity invasion of Iraq. 
Conventional U.S. forces may be overwhelmingly superior to 
the insurgents we now see in Iraq with regard to traditional 
combat, but an Iraqi landscape highlighted by suicide and 
roadside bombs, assassinations, and beheadings is far from 
traditional combat, and thus, making the presence of a CVN 
and its strike group less relevant in that it masses too 
much firepower for the low intensity phase of the conflict. 
Operations in Iraq focus on land forces and tend to 
demand large numbers of dismounted troops. However, air 
forces do make important contributions, especially in 
reconnaissance and strike. Reconnaissance with unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) greatly improves commanders’ views of 
their areas of operations. Strike, generally conducted as 
close air support, occurs less frequently in COIN than in 
conventional combat but still plays an important role, for 
example, in reducing insurgent strongholds.81 
All of the services employ UAVs for reconnaissance in 
Iraq. The most useful and heavily tasked is the Air Force 
Predator, a turbocharged aircraft equipped with synthetic-
aperture radar and electro-optical and infrared sensors that 
is flown remotely and can stay airborne for 24 hours. In 
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addition to flying reconnaissance, Predators attack with 
laser-guided Hellfire missiles fitted with shaped-charge, 
blast-fragmentation, or augmented-charged warheads.82 The 
U.S. Army’s principal UAV is the RQ-5A Hunter, a twin-boomed 
aircraft equipped with electro-optical and infrared sensors 
that is able to stay airborne for 18 hours.83 UAVs provide 
persistent surveillance of areas of interest, such as 
suspected terrorist safe houses, urban centers, lines of 
communication, and terrain surrounding major cities. When 
not armed, they provide data to other systems for rapid 
engagement of targets. Prior to the invasion, the U.S. Air 
Force fielded a prototype of the remote-operations video-
enhanced receiver (ROVER),84 a man-portable laptop computer 
that receives streaming data from airborne sensors. Equipped 
with ROVER, a joint tactical air controller can see pictures 
gained by sensors mounted on UAVs, fighters, and bombers. 
ROVER IV includes a point-and-click feature that allows the 
operator to designate a target on the display and send that 
designation to the attack aircraft. This is especially 
useful when the air controller and other observers do not 
have line-of-sight to the target and therefore cannot 
determine its location by lasing. Moreover, it eliminates 
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the need for talk-on, i.e., verbal description of the 
target, which can be time-consuming.85 
LHD class ships or light to medium carriers should be 
seriously considered for low intensity conflict such as the 
one’s currently underway in OEF and OIF as a viable 
alternative to super carriers. Augmented by UAVs and net-
centrically connected, these platforms provide a more 
appropriate measure of firepower and capability to the 
equation. With the acquisition of aircraft such as the STOVL 
F-35B and its complement of modern precision munitions, it 
could be an effective strike platform comparable to that 
provided by CVN’s. OIF demonstrates the American capability 
to mass firepower in a joint and combined arena in a very 
capable manner, but must be, as Walter Boyne described in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, 
and Why, “tempered against the notion that future enemies 
may not be as inept as the Iraqi Army or have totally 
counterproductive leadership.”86  
U.S. sea-based airpower in the form of super carriers 
played a relevant role and has evolved into a very capable 
net-centric combat force during the high-intensity phase of 
the campaign. When comparing land-based Air Force assets vs. 
carrier based air power and the matter of integrated strike-
warfare operations, Lambeth’s Air Force-Navy Integration in 
Strike Warfare, A Role Model for Seamless Joint-Service 
Operations Naval War College Review article describes the 
integration as; “the two services are, and should duly 
regard one another as, natural allies in the roles and 
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resources arena. They did not compete with each other in OEF 
or OIF but rather supported one another in the successful 
pursuit of joint campaign objectives. When viewed from an 
operational rather than a bureaucratic perspective, the Air 
Force’s and Navy’s long-standing involvement in air-
delivered conventional force projection are complementary 
rather than competitive in the service of joint force 
commanders; land-based bombers and fighters and carrier-
based fighters are not duplicative and redundant but rather 
offer overlapping and mutually reinforcing as well as unique 
capabilities for conducting joint strike warfare. For 
example, Air Force long-range bombers can penetrate deeper 
into the littoral reaches than can carrier-based strike 
fighters supported solely by organic tanking. They also can 
launch directly from their home bases in the U.S., if no 
carrier strike group is positioned within immediate reach of 
a designated target area. Unlike bombers, however, carrier 
air power can provide a sustained presence as long as may be 
required over a target area once it is in place and provided 
with the requisite nonorganic tanker support. The greatest 
liability of aircraft carriers for immediate crisis response 
is that they may not be close enough on short notice to 
where they are most needed. In contrast, the greatest 
advantage of long-range bombers is that they can be over a 
target set anywhere in the world within twenty hours of 
takeoff. The downside for bombers, however, is that they 
cannot loiter for long or regenerate striking power once 
their munitions have been expended, whereas carriers – 
especially with more than one on station – can offer 
persistence once they are in place.  
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Therein lies the synergy offered by Air Force bombers, land-
based fighters and Navy carrier air wings when employed in 
an integrated fashion.”87   
In summary, the overall contribution of strike sorties 
provided to OIF by U.S. sea-based aircraft measured at 
thirteen-and-a-half percent, and although carriers surged as 
required to meet operational tempo, they never reached 
maximum sortie generation capability. There are two points 
concerning this worth citing; first, the number of sea-based 
strike sorties measured at a small amount of the total 
effort, which explains the logic to procure a new class of 
aircraft carrier in CVN-21, which is designed to increase 
sortie rates by about 25 percent.88 On the other hand, the 
current Nimitz class CVN has a concentration of untapped 
firepower for the preponderance of on-station time in 
theater. Because of this, it’s feasible to envision an 
alternative in the way U.S. sea-based air power is employed, 
e.g., a more distributed number of sea-based air platforms, 
that can be tailored for high and low intensity scenarios. 
It makes sense to invest in smaller conventional carriers 
that provide distribution of firepower and flexibility of 
mission, instead for solely procuring large-deck carriers. 
The synergy between Air Force and Navy strike aircraft 
described above can be enabled by smaller carriers and 
amphibious ships as well. 
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IV. FALKLANDS WAR 
 On 2 April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland 
Islands, a remote British colony in the South Atlantic. The 
move led to a brief, but bitter war. Over the next 10 weeks, 
the Falkland’s 1,800 inhabitants found themselves the focus 
of the world’s attention. The isolated British dependency 
had been overrun by an Argentine naval task force. The token 
garrison of 80 Royal Marines were taken prisoner, after they 
inflicted a handful of casualties. Within a few hours 150 
years of British government had ended. For the Argentines 
the British possession of the islands - which they called 
the Malvinas - was a long standing affront to national 
pride. They traced their claim back to the days of the 
Spanish empire, of which both the Falklands and Argentina 
had been a part.  
 The decision to use force instead of diplomacy was 
taken by Argentina’s military junta. It hoped to use the 
nationalist fervor a short successful war would arouse to 
divert attention from the country’s shattered economy. 
However, winning the Falklands was hardly a glittering 
prize. Set in the wild seas of the South Atlantic, Britain’s 
largest remaining colony was about 350 miles from Argentina, 
its barren ground supported more sheep and penguins than 
people. To the surprise of the Argentines the British 
Government immediately decided it was prepared to fight to 
reclaim the islands. The British Prime Minister dismissed 




not be re-taken. The British PM ordered a task force to be 
assembled to fight a war 8,000 miles away from the British 
Isles.89  
In the days before the invasion British intelligence 
became aware that a military crisis was fast approaching.90 
Contrary to Argentine expectations, the British government 
reacted strongly to the building crisis by ordering the 
sailing of three SSN’s (HMS Conqueror, Spartan, and 
Splendid), even before the invasion on 2 April, as signs of 
pending Argentine military action appeared.91 Preparations 
to send a task force to repossess the Falklands began three 
days before they were invaded.92 British planners 
appreciated from the very beginning - from before the task 
force was assembled - that to achieve the aims of the 
government might well require the landing of a substantial 
land force on the Falklands. This would be a difficult and 
hazardous task the success of which would depend critically 
on the control of the sea and airspace at the time of the 
amphibious force’s approach, landing, and consolidation.93 
Airpower would be the key, for ships alone could not provide 
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the control required. Surface ships and submarines could 
defend against a surface or submarine threat, but they could 
not reduce sufficiently the vulnerability of the amphibious 
force to air attack. This vulnerability would be 
particularly stark at the time of the landings. To achieve 
control of the air would require air power, and this could 
only be effectively achieved organically. The British 
aircraft carriers and the Sea Harriers were, therefore, the 
sine qua non for the success of the amphibious operation. 
Once ashore and consolidated, the land force would need to 
be supported and sustained. Here again air power would be 
crucial, and planning had to ensure it was available to the 
land force in the quantity and of the quality required.94   
Once it broke, the news of the invasion exploded like a 
political bombshell. The Foreign Secretary and two junior 
ministers had resigned by the end of the week; they took the 
blame for Britain’s poor preparations and plans to 
decommission HMS Endurance, the navy’s only Antarctic patrol 
vessel. It was a move which may have led the junta to 
believe the UK had little interest in keeping the 
Falklands.95 There was also every indication that the UK 
would probably have no operational aircraft carriers, the 
HMS Hermes and Invincible both victims of defense cuts due 
to a belief that carriers were no longer required in 
defense. As far as the junta leader Galtieri and Anaya were 
concerned the situation was simple: no British carriers 
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meant no air cover, no air cover meant no British surface 
ships, no surface ships meant no British landing force, no 
landing force meant “no contest.” The Argentine reasoning 
was sound, but their timing wrong.96  
Several serious political-military miscalculations by 
the Argentine junta were involved. The first was the start 
of the war in 1982 instead of waiting a year. Great Britain 
had planned to decommission its aircraft carriers later in 
the year. If that had occurred, there would have been no 
possible way for Great Britain to project effective air 
power into the South Atlantic region.97 By 5 April the first 
battle ships, including two aircraft carriers (HMS 
Invincible and Hermes), hurriedly set sail for the South 
Atlantic. In all, Britain sent over 100 ships and 27,000 
personnel to take part in the war. By then Britain’s cause 
had already won the backing of the UN. The Security Council 
voted 10-1 backing a resolution that demanded the immediate 
withdrawal of Argentinean forces from the Falklands.98  
Due to the nature of the theater - a small group of 
islands surrounded by isolated ocean - the air component was 
vital to both sides during the war. At the outset of the 
war, the forces dedicated to the fight by each side, though 
not identical, were virtually balanced in strength. The 
British advantage in carriers and submarines was offset by 
the substantial numerical edge of the Argentines in fixed 
wing attack aircraft. In terms of ground forces, the 
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Argentine army in the Falklands was one and one quarter 
times the size of the British expeditionary force.99 In 
purely numerical terms, the Argentines held a considerable 
advantage in numbers of fixed wing aircraft available for 
employment. The total number of Argentine fixed wing 
aircraft employed was 216 against a British total of just 
55. This was a ratio of almost four to one.100  
On 21 April, British helicopters from the frigate 
Antrim and the fleet auxiliary Tidespring landed 
reconnaissance teams on a glacier on South Georgia Island. 
Alerted of the British naval activity, Argentina had the 
submarine Santa Fe (the former USS Catfish) discharge 
supplies and 20 marines at the island's port village of 
Grytviken on the 24th. The next day, a British Wessex 
helicopter caught the Argentine submarine departing on the 
surface. Two depth charges and subsequent air attacks 
crippled the Santa Fe, forcing it back into port, where it 
later sank. Later that same day, British warships peppered 
the defending garrison with gunfire, enabling a small Royal 
Marine assault force to land by helicopter to storm and 
eventually capture the Argentine positions.101  
 In the early morning darkness of 1 May, 1,000-pound 
bombs dropped by a lone British Vulcan B.2 strategic bomber 
cratered the Port Stanley airstrip on East Falkland Island. 
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Later that morning, Sea Harriers from Hermes put additional 
ordnance on the airstrip, and on another airfield at Goose 
Green. Royal Navy warships contributed to the damage by 
carrying out shore bombardment against Argentine positions. 
Reacting, the Argentine Air Force launched 56 sorties 
against the British. The destroyer Glamorgan and frigates 
Alacrity and Arrow absorbed damage from near misses and 
strafing. British Sea Harriers on combat air patrol splashed 
four of the Argentine aircraft. With British intentions 
evident, The Argentine’s planned to defend the "liberated" 
Malvinas by attacking with sea and air forces from several 
directions. Approaching undetected from the northwest early 
on the 2nd of May, the Argentine aircraft carrier 
Vienticinco de Mayo readied to launch what would have been 
the world's first carrier vs. carrier attack since WW II. 
However, the lack of wind thwarted the launch of its 
aircraft, forcing Argentina's lone carrier to withdraw.102 
In one of the more significant events of the conflict, 
airpower played no part. On May 2, the British SSN (attack 
submarine, nuclear) HMS Conqueror sank the Argentine cruiser 
General Belgrano. Airpower was, however, affected by that 
event. The warships of the Argentine navy, including its 
only carrier, Vienticinco de mayo, were immediately 
withdrawn to the mainland and never again ventured beyond 
the 12-mile limit imposed by the British. The aircraft and 
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crews of the naval air arm were the only elements of the 
Argentine navy to play a part in further combat.103  
A second defining event of the war came just two days 
later. In the early afternoon of May 4, in conditions of low 
cloud and poor visibility 85 nautical miles south of Port 
Stanley, the Type 42 British destroyer, HMS Sheffield, was 
struck by a single AM-39 Exocet antiship missile fired from 
a range of 25 miles by one of a pair of Argentine Super 
Etendard aircraft operating from Rio Grande air base on the 
Argentine mainland. Although the warhead did not explode, 
the fire created within the ship spread very swiftly and 
could not be controlled. The ship was abandoned five hours 
later with a loss of 21 of its 268-man crew, twenty four 
others were injured. While the destroyer burned, Hermes 
launched three Sea Harriers against a landing strip at Goose 
Green where some Argentine aircraft were parked. On the 
first pass, a Sea Harrier was brought down by anti-aircraft 
fire, and its pilot killed.104  This showed that it was not 
to be a one-sided conflict. The vulnerability of the British 
task force to modern weapons systems had been dramatically 
exposed.105 Stunned by these losses, the battle group moved 
farther offshore and contemplated the day’s result. The 
precious Sea Harriers, it was decided, would concentrate on 
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achieving air supremacy. The RAF GR.3 Harriers, fitted with 
a ground attack computer and navigation system, would take 
up the high-risk attack role when they arrived in theater. 
The Sea Harrier, developed from the GR.3, was important to 
naval activities. Twenty Sea Harriers were operated from the 
carriers HMS Hermes and Invincible mainly for fleet air 
defense. Although they destroyed 21 Argentine aircraft in 
air combat - in part due to using the American-supplied 
latest variant (AIM-9L) Sidewinder missile and the Argentine 
aircraft operating at extreme range - they couldn't 
establish complete air superiority and prevent Argentine 
attacks during day or night nor stop the daily flights of 
Argentine C-130 Hercules transports to the islands. Harrier 
GR.3s were operated by the RAF from Hermes and provided 
close air support to the ground forces and attacked 
Argentine positions. Had most of the Sea Harriers been lost, 
the GR.3s would have replaced them in air patrol duties. 
Four Harrier GR.3s were lost to ground fire, accidents, or 
mechanical failure.106 
The next two weeks saw British attempts at a blockade 
and Argentine attempts to resupply its Falkland garrison -
these were short engagements that took a bloody toll on both 
sides. The British captured the Argentinean spy ship Narwal 
and sank the cargo vessel Isla de Los Estados. More 
Argentinean aircraft fell to Royal Navy SAMs. A raiding 
party flown in by helicopter from Hermes destroyed an 
ammunition dump on Pebble Island and 11 additional aircraft. 
An Argentine A-4 holed the frigate Glasgow with a 1,000-
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pound bomb, which, fortunately for the British, failed to 
detonate.107 From 4 to 20 May, the conflict went into an air 
war lull. The British were waiting for the rest of the land 
force to join the task force. The Argentines were reviewing 
what had occurred, regrouping their forces, and planning a 
maximum air effort in opposition to the British landings. 
Argentine planners developed a 75-sortie effort to launch 
against the British as they landed, reasoning that maximum 
confusion in the British defenses would be created if they 
were flooded with aircraft.108  
Late on 20 May, using deception and the cover of 
darkness, Britain began to send in Special Forces and 
marines to secure positions around Port Carlos on the 
northwest corner of East Falkland Island. On the day of the 
British amphibious landings, 21 May, an estimated 60 sorties 
reached the Malvinas in pursuit of the tactical aim, but the 
confusion that was planned was only partially realized. No 
Argentine aircraft appeared until the morning was well 
advanced and then, having had to work their way through the 
outer defenses and having little tactical freedom due to 
lack of fuel endurance, they appeared a few at a time at 
widely separated intervals of time, the aircraft took 
advantage of the surrounding mountainous terrain to swarm in 
against the British combatants supporting the operation and 
failed to disrupt the movement of troops ashore. Ten 
Argentine aircraft were lost, nine to Sea Harrier defenses 
and one to a SAM. British forces lost HMS Ardent, and HMS 
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Argonaut was seriously damaged with three other ships 
damaged to a lesser extent.109  
The next day bad weather on the mainland grounded 
Argentine aircraft and gave the Royal Navy a respite, 
allowing more materials and troops to be landed. The 
Argentine air attacks resumed on 23 May. The next two days 
saw intense air activity resulting in British losses of HMS 
Antelope and HMS Coventry and substantial damage to HMS Sir 
Galahad. The most significant British loss of the period was 
not, however, a naval vessel but a merchant vessel 
supporting the operations. On 25 May, by flying at very low 
level and using deceptive routing, two Super Etendards 
equipped with Exocet AM-39 antiship missiles closed on the 
British task force undetected. MV Atlantic Conveyor, 
undefended, was hit and caught fire. Twelve lives were lost. 
Fortunately for the British, all the Harriers and Sea 
Harriers the ship had brought south plus some helicopters 
had already been flown off. Still, the British lost a 
considerable amount of logistics materials and an important 
asset critical to the success of the campaign. 
The last day of intensive Argentine air attacks, 27 
May, in San Carlos Water, saw the most successful Argentine 
strike against a land target in the war. Argentine A-4s hit 
the British main logistics area and medical dressing station 
at Ajax Bay. Guns, mortars, and ammunition being loaded into 
helicopter nets were destroyed, as were all of 45 Commando 
Battalion’s antitank missiles and launchers. Several men 
                     
109  Funnell, It was a Bit of a Close Call: Some Thoughts on the 
South Atlantic War, 221-256. 
 59
were killed and wounded. The dressing station was rendered 
unusable for the rest of the war.110 
Late in the war, British amphibious landings were to be 
conducted at Fitzroy-Bluff Cove in East Falkland. The plan 
was to move 1,200 troops of the Scots and Welsh Guards to 
the east coast rather than having them arrive by foot. The 
plan was considered hazardous, but doing so would save time 
and effort. British amphibious commanders did not like the 
plan, but considered that they would probably get away with 
it as long as they were swift, spent as little time as 
possible in unloading the LSL (landing ship, logistic) and 
the weather stayed favorable. In the event, none of these 
applied. On 8 June, the landing was detected by the 
Argentines who moved swiftly to mount an air attack 
utilizing Daggers and A-4s. The A-4s found Sir Galahad and 
Sir Tristram unloading in Pleasant Bay. Sir Tristram had 
disembarked many of its troops but, unfortunately, Sir 
Galahad had not. Both ships were bombed and strafed, 
suffering serious damage and loss of life. The most damage 
and carnage resulted from the detonation of a bomb deep 
within Sir Galahad. In total, 50 men were killed and another 
57 wounded.  
The Argentine Daggers did not reach Pleasant Bay. En 
route they came upon HMS Plymouth Leaving San Carlos Water 
alone and without air cover. They attacked and badly damaged 
the ship before returning safely home. In fact, all of the 
Daggers and A-4s involved in these missions recovered 
safely. Such was not the case for the follow-up missions now 
                     
110  Funnell, It was a Bit of a Close Call: Some Thoughts on the 
South Atlantic War, 221-256. 
 60
mounted by the Argentines. The defenses had been alerted and 
harriers were deployed on combat air patrol (CAP) overhead. 
The result was no further damage inflicted on the ships and 
three Argentine A-4s lost.111 Enough ground forces were 
ashore to sustain the campaign, and British forces were soon 
entrenched on the outskirts of Port Stanley.112 
At 9:00 P.M. local time on 14 June 1982, the Argentine 
commanders and governor of the Malvinas, Brigadier general 
Menendez, surrendered all Argentine forces on the islands to 
the commander land forces Falkland Islands, Major General 
Moore. At the loss of 1,002 lives (256 British, 746 
Argentine) and more than 2,000 wounded, British 
administration of and sovereignty over the Falkland Islands 
had been restored.113 
A. FALKLANDS WAR ANALYSIS 
Air power was a significant factor in the war; British 
forces depended on sea-based air power to attempt to gain 
air superiority. They eventually achieved that goal, 
although tenuously at best. Without the Royal Navy’s 
aircraft carriers, Great Britain would have been unable to 
contest the Argentine action. As it was, Argentine air 
strikes continued to deliver heavy blows until nearly the 
final week of the conflict. The lack of a sea-based airborne 
early warning capability was a serious deficiency for the 
Brits. British land-based air power provided vital aerial 
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reconnaissance information to allow the movement of naval 
forces into position near South Georgia Island and the 
Falklands. The Falklands had only three airfields. The 
longest and only paved runway was at the capital, Stanley, 
and even it was too short to support fast jets. Early in the 
campaign, the successful Vulcan B.2 bombing of the airfield 
at Port Stanley had greater strategic than tactical results. 
It led the Argentine Air Force to withdraw its best all-
weather fighters to protect its mainland airbases against 
similar attacks, although the bombing did not prevent 
continued use of the airfield for re-supply.114 Launching 
major strikes from the mainland severely hampered Argentine 
efforts at forward staging and conducting combat air patrols 
& close air support over the islands. The effective loiter 
time and tactical freedom of incoming Argentine aircraft was 
low, especially when they were later compelled to negotiate 
British outer defenses in any attempt to attack the 
islands.115 In basic terms, the air war in the South 
Atlantic was one in which land-based air forces attempted to 
prevent a naval task force from firstly putting a land force 
ashore and then supporting it. One can only wonder how the 
outcome might have been different had the Argentines decided 
to conduct fighter jet operations from Port Stanley 
airfield. In the opinion of Ray Funnell, the author of It 
Was a Bit of a Close Call, “the key to success is the 
airfield at Stanley…with Argentine fast jets operating from 
Stanley, the operational calculus is transformed. Who now is 
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forced to operate at the limit of range in conducting 
offensive operations? Had the Argentines achieved the 
capability of flying their fighters from Stanley, the course 
of the war would probably have been quite different.”116 
This was the first major conflict involving the 
sustained use of such weapon systems as vertical short take-
off and landing (VSTOL) aircraft, and antiship missiles.117  
This campaign proves that smaller sea-based air platforms in 
the form of light to medium conventional carriers can be a 
viable combat force if used astutely in conjunction with a 
jointly netted force. Control of the air was seen by both 
sides as one of the keys to success. The British started 
with fewer assets, but their thinking on how to use them to 
obtain control of the air was superior: the Argentines began 
with most of the advantages and failed to capitalize on that 
fortunate circumstance.118 Royal Navy Sea Harriers proved to 
be effective air defense fighters, particularly when armed 
with an all-aspect heat-seeking (AIM-9L) air-to-air missile, 
and facing enemy aircraft that were older and could not 
tarry to fight. RAF GR-3 Harriers proved their worth at 
Goose Green when they facilitated the victory by taking out 
a nest of Argentine 35mm AAA (anti-aircraft artillery) guns 
that were holding up the attack.119 Argentine air attacks 
pointed out the need for all units, ashore or afloat, to 
have adequate SAM (surface to air missiles)/AAA (Anti-
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aircraft artillery) defenses. Afloat, the effective use of 
cruise missiles by the Argentines demonstrated the need for 
chaff launchers and missile decoys, and low-altitude capable 
SAMs or CIWS (close-in weapons system) aboard all ships.  
 The Sea Harriers were stretched to their range limits. 
Because they could land vertically, Harriers didn’t need 
much fuel in reserve. As the campaign went on, Harrier 
pilots began adapting to, and recovering with, getting 
shorter and shorter on fuel reserves for recovery to the 
aircraft carriers, the Harrier pilots knew they were going 
to land on first attempt. Landing allowance was about 400 
pounds. By comparison, the figure for an F-14 at the time 
was about 5000 pounds, depending on distance to alternate 
landing field, or, blue water ops. And they flew in every 
kind of weather, day or night. If they could see the wake 
and see the deck when returning to the ship, they could land 
very safely. One Harrier was guided home by flares tossed 
behind the ship.120 
The Argentine Air Force and Navy air arms were 
effective, considering the handicaps they faced. They both 
practiced low altitude tactics in the interval between the 
occupation of the Falklands and the arrival of the British 
Task Force. The failure of a number of their bombs to 
detonate saved several British ships. However, that is a 
result that unfortunately can be expected when new tactics 
are rapidly put into action. The Argentine naval pilots were 
much more experienced in attacking ships. The Argentine Air 
Force used reconnaissance aircraft and ground observers to 
good advantage in locating targets, and monitoring the 
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British CAP (combat air patrol) situation in the target 
area. The Argentine Navy air arm similarly used its Neptune 
aircraft (the Lockheed P-2 Neptune was a naval patrol bomber 
and anti-submarine warfare aircraft) to provide target 
location for its Super Entendard-Exocet missile strikes. The 
lack of more aerial tankers, and high performance fighters 
equipped for aerial tanking capability, meant that the 
Argentine Air Force could not contest the Sea Harriers for 
air superiority. Argentine Air Force transport aircraft 
performed very well under difficult conditions. The role of 
helicopters was a very major one, both in ASW (anti-
submarine warfare), insertion and extraction of ground 
reconnaissance units, and in movement of troops, equipment 
and supplies.121 More than 80 percent of all sorties flown 
by the British were those of their helicopters and, of 
those, more than 80 percent were moving people and stores. 
The Royal Navy helicopters flew 10,381 sorties for a total 
of 21,049 flying hours.122 
Both sides understood the importance of control of the 
air, and did their best to effectively use what they had to 
achieve that end. A greater effort by the two Argentine air 
arms to place detachments of their aircraft at the Port of 
Stanley airfield, well protected by air defense radar, SAM’s 
and AAA, might have made a difference in the outcome. It 
certainly could have delayed the attempted landing.123  
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The most capable air weapon system the Argentines 
possessed, the Super Entendard-Exocet combination, was in 
too short supply to wage a successful attrition battle. The 
Argentine Navy did well to achieve the two hits with the 
antiship missile. That weapon was a generation beyond 
anything they had previously possessed, and it would be a 
difficult task for any air arm to become combat proficient 
with a new weapon system in a few months.124 
There are certainly indications of inadequate 
coordination between the Argentine Air Force and the 
Argentine Navy in scheduling air strikes. The intermittent 
timing of the air strikes provided the Sea Harriers time to 
return to their carriers, refuel, rearm and take CAP station 
again between attacks. A greater concentration in time might 
have overwhelmed the British air defense system. The same 
criticism can be leveled at the Argentine Air Force in 
coordinating its own strikes. This highlights a lack of 
adequate situational awareness on the part of the Argentine 
command. The British command was better off, but just 
barely.125 
At the breakout of the Falklands War, British carrier 
aviation was virtually defunct with their carriers headed to 
decommissioning. In 1981 the Conservative government's 
Defense Secretary John Nott produced a white paper proposing 
major cuts for the navy in the next ten years.126 The 
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Falklands War revitalized their belief in the need to 
maintain a sea-based air power capability. The proposed 
cutback in the surface fleet was abandoned and replacements 
for many of the lost ships and helicopters plus more Sea 
Harriers were ordered.127 Today the British demonstrate its 
commitment to carrier aviation and are set to procure two 
large deck multi-purpose Queen Elizabeth class aircraft 
carriers. They will displace 75,000 tons at full load and 
carry 40 F-35B STOVL, and later F-35C CTOL if they choose. 
Defense secretary Des Browne confirmed the £3.8bn order for 
the two carriers on 25 July 2007. The carriers will take the 
form of large, conventional carriers, which will be adapted 
for STOVL operations. The carriers, expected to remain in 
service for 50 years, will be convertible to catapult 
assisted take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) operations 
for the generation of aircraft after the F-35. The Royal 
Navy and RAF will operate the STOVL F-35B variant. 
Medium conventional aircraft carriers represent a 
feasible alternative to the 100,000 ton displacement nuclear 
platform for low to medium intensity campaigns against 
adversaries deemed not a peer competitor, which may 
constitute a majority of U.S. asymmetric conflicts today. 
HMS Invincible and Hermes were light aircraft carriers in 
the 22,000 ton displacement range. Today’s U.S. LHD air 
capable amphibious assault ships are in the 40,000-45,000 
ton displacement class and can carry from 12-20 AV-8B STOVL 
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Harriers.128 In the future, U.S. LHD’s equipped with 5th 
generation129 aircraft such as the F-35 Lightning II, which 
can employ highly efficient smart weapons, can account for 
the many low to medium intensity asymmetric conflicts that 
may present themselves in our near future and that appear to 
be the norm.  
The sinking of the General Belgrano was a defining 
event in this conflict. It established that the Royal Navy 
through its SSNs commanded the seas;130 it established a 
relevant point about what kind of force is best suited to 
achieving sea control, a prerequisite to sea-based offensive 
air operations. The submarine posed a formidable threat to 
the Argentine combat force; it was one which they were not 
appropriately equipped to negotiate, tipping the scales in 
favor of the British.  
Current U.S. Navy outlook towards combat at sea 
envisions precision firepower netted with shared information 
dominance. Described as FORCENet and Sea Strike by the Naval 
Aviation Enterprise in Naval Aviation Vision 2020, its 
tenets are: 
FORCENet ties the pillars of Sea Strike, Sea 
Shield, and Sea Basing together. It is the 
persistent integration of warriors, sensors, 
networks, platforms, and weapons into a 
networked, distributed combat force across the 
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spectrum of conflict from seabed to space and sea 
to land. It implements the Global Information 
Grid (GIG) and is the Navy’s portal to GIG 
Enterprise Services (GIG-ES) – a grid of value-
added information, web, and computing 
capabilities that improve user access to mission 
critical data, enhancing the pervasive awareness 
of the battlespace. It will transform the way we 
receive information, enabling decision-makers to 
react quickly and decisively with superb 
situational awareness. FORCENet will harness 
information required for knowledge-based combat 
operations and increased survivability, and will 
also provide real-time enhanced collaborative 
planning amongst joint and coalition partners. It 
will speed the distribution of smart-weapon 
sensor information, which will improve Battle 
Damage Assessment (BDA) and facilitate re-strike 
decisions. It will vastly improve our 
capabilities in Electronic Warfare (EW), littoral 
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Information 
Operations (IO), and will enable Naval Aviation 
combat forces to achieve battlespace dominance in 
concert with other Naval and Joint forces across 
the full range of military operations.131 
Sea Strike is the projection of precise, 
persistent, and responsive offensive firepower. 
It is how the 21st century Navy and Marine Corps 
will exert direct, decisive, and sustained 
influence in Joint campaigns. The Carrier Strike 
Group (CSG) and its embarked Carrier Air Wing 
(CVW), and the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 
and its Marine Expeditionary Unit’s Aviation 
Combat Element (ACE), are ideally suited for this 
type of effects-based warfare, generating the 
right effect on the right target at the right 
time. With real-time battlespace awareness, the 
CSG and ESG can deliver high-volume, lethal fires 
against critical vulnerabilities, defeating the 
enemy’s strategy early in the conflict. Sea 
Strike will improve the dynamic application of 
persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
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Reconnaissance (ISR), Time Sensitive Strikes 
(TSS), Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), IO, and 
covert strike to deliver devastating power and 
accuracy. Sea Strike capitalizes on early war-
termination opportunities that would be lost 
under attrition-oriented warfare, and the 
strategic flexibility and operational 
independence of our CSGs and ESGs enables us to 
take the fight to the enemy – on our terms.132  
Within this conceptual framework, the large-deck 
nuclear super carrier continues to be the naval formation 
centerpiece. Current global threat environments critical to 
U.S. security interests in the form of small to medium level 
conflicts that are characterized by terrorism and irregular 
warfare do not require the ability to deliver high-volume 
lethal fires against critical vulnerabilities. The CVN is 
too costly and masses excessive firepower for this scenario. 
What the Falklands War case study and Naval Aviation Vision 
2020 do indicate is the requirement for persistent low-
intensity precise firepower to be delivered on notice, yet 
sporadically, coupled with information dominance. In this 
scenario, ships of the ESG type class are the force 
configuration that is needed to more accurately address the 
current threat environment.  
In the following chapter, the thesis will examine the 
lessons of each of the case studies and analyze them against 
national security, military and naval strategies through a 
lens of the current threat environment.   
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V. ANALYSIS  
Debates regarding large-deck vs. small and medium sea-
based air platforms have been conducted on more than one 
occasion in the past. The issue not only concerns the size 
of the ship, but also whether it should be nuclear or 
conventionally propelled.133 There was also debate 
concerning the emphasis and size placed on the U.S. Navy 
within the Maritime Strategy during the Reagan 
administration regarding aircraft carriers’ ability to deter 
and engage the Soviet Union. One view suggested that the 
budget invested in the naval build-up should be redirected 
towards NATO ground and air forces.134 When Admiral Elmo 
Zumwalt became the Chief of Naval Operations in 1970,135 and 
with an unpopular Vietnam War and weak economy, Congress 
began considering reductions in the DoD budget. Admiral 
Zumwalt introduced an idea, borrowed from the British, for a 
less expensive, smaller aircraft carrier. “His sea-control 
ship, similar to the new HMS Invincible, would operate about 
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ten helicopters and ten AV-8s for limited ASW, strike, and 
air-defense missions.” In opposition to his senior aviation 
advisors, Admiral Zumwalt believed that more small carriers 
would be more valuable to the Navy than few large 
carriers.136   
In June 2000, after a four-year formal Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA) plus three high-level reviews by the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Acquisition 
Board approved the U.S. Navy’s plan to develop a new class 
of large-deck nuclear-powered aircraft carriers; CVN-21.137 
In an article of the June 2001 Proceedings of the U.S. Naval 
Institute, David A. Perin discusses the alternatives that 
were considered and rejected. He states in the article, “the 
least radical alternative was a mid-sized carrier similar to 
the Midway (CV-41). It was determined that mid-sized 
carriers were a little cheaper but provide a lot less combat 
power.” The data indicated that large decks could generate 
more sorties and devote the additional sorties to strike 
missions, and that “a new 75-plane CVX force can generate 
roughly twice the number of strike sorties as the same 
number of a (mid-sized) 55-plane carrier.” Perin continues, 
regarding proposals for small carriers; a “more radical 
alternative involved a combination of small carriers and 
other systems, such as land-based aircraft, missile ships, 
and even large mobile offshore bases.” The AoA found that 
“one small carrier doesn’t carry enough aircraft, and that 
the CVX mission-need-statement calls for CVX to conduct 
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simultaneous strike and battlespace dominance operations, 
and that a small carrier doesn’t carry enough aircraft to 
meet this fundamental criterion.” Where it was determined 
that two small carriers could accomplish what one large-deck 
CVX could do, the CVX AoA found that “two small carriers 
could do the job but would cost too much, indicating that a 
CVX large-deck costs less than two-thirds as much to buy and 
operate as two comparable 40-plane CVX’s”138 Perin argues 
that STOVL and small carriers are different issues, he 
states, “…STOVL JSF will likely operate from carriers on 
some occasions, and might eventually prove desirable for 
regular carrier application, but this would not change the 
argument against small decks for the Navy. For example, 
proponents of STOVL often argue that it would provide more 
flexible launch and recovery operations on a carrier…the AoA 
showed that if realized, the advantages would be more 
important for large carriers that have many aircraft on 
deck. Conversely, the AoA showed that STOVL aircraft are not 
needed for an efficient 40-plane carrier design. In sum, 
STOVL aircraft and carrier size are separate issues. STOVL 
aircraft make sense for the Marine Corps and perhaps 
eventually for the Navy. Small carriers don’t make sense for 
the Navy, even with STOVL aircraft.”139 What Perin, who was 
a member of the AoA during these deliberations, did not 
envision, was the asymmetric threats that large decks have 
been called upon to address, and that they are an 
inefficient platform for the mission. He minimized the 
aspect of CVN vulnerability based on historical fact that 
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antiship missile attacks have been very limited, and that 
the victims were defenseless or unalerted.  
Despite the debate and analysis conducted in the past 
regarding the feasibility of incorporating sea-based air 
platforms in the form of medium or small air-capable ships, 
the status quo has been maintained under the premise that a 
CVN is the right platform for the current and foreseeable 
strategic threat environment. Carrier aviation leaders have 
fought the concept of a small aircraft carrier from the 
birth of Admiral Zumwalt’s sea-control ship. Their view is 
that large-deck carriers are more effective than any number 
of smaller carriers. A large carrier embarks more aircraft, 
fuel, and ammunition, giving the air wing more staying 
power; it is also more survivable, through the use of armor, 
defensive armament, and passive weapon counter-measure 
systems.140 In an age of maneuverable guided antiship cruise 
missiles of supersonic speed, survivability is a calculated 
guess. Despite the survivability factors mentioned, the CVN 
is dependent on maneuvering with its surface ship strike 
force for protection to enable defense-in-depth, at 
considerable costs; costs that could go to offensive 
capabilities rather than defense of a ship. Regarding the 
stated higher degree of effectiveness, the concentration of 
striking power in a single platform makes it a high value 
target that any determined adversary would be foolish not to 
neutralize.  
The great advance in modern strike warfare has been the 
increase in precision, brought about by the advance in 
guided munitions. This has resulted in a shift of U.S. joint 
                     
140  Brown, Up, Up and Away, 36-40. 
 75
doctrine to effects-based strikes; rather than measuring 
performance by number of sorties or tonnage of bombs 
delivered. Highly specific targeting of a precise location 
of an enemy and/or critical infrastructure is to be 
conducted at a time of our choosing to overwhelm an 
adversary with the intent to minimize, as much as feasibly 
possible, the potential fallout of collateral damage – to 
bring about the strategic end state. Has the advancement in 
guidance precision altered the need for sea-based air power 
operating from super carriers? Yes. There is less need for 
high sortie rates. The following information supports this.  
The ability to kill a target is the result of the 
interplay of two factors: the ability to get a warhead near 
a target (guidance precision), and the destructive power of 
the warhead. Guidance technology has in effect doubled the 
effectiveness of the warhead’s explosive package over the 
last 50 years.141 The reason for the high probability of 
impact of the modern warhead is CEP (Circular Error 
Probable) distance vs. destructive radius, in that, a 
target’s center lies within the destructive blast radius of 
modern precision guided warheads. The number of weapons it 
takes to kill a target is dependent on the weapon’s CEP and 
the destructiveness of its warhead. It has been asserted 
that as a result of these improvements, the number of 
weapons it takes to kill a target has been falling rapidly, 
and it now only takes a single modern strike fighter to 
accomplish what an entire fleet of WWII era aircraft did. 
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According to an analysis conducted by the Naval Air Warfare 
Center (NAWC) Weapons Division-Revolution in Military 
Affairs Center, “a WWII strategic bomber had a CEP of 1,744 
ft., which meant it took 2,794 WWII 500lb bombs to kill a 
point target. This equates to the full bomb load of 175 B-17 
bombers. If one equates this to a modern strike fighter and 
the four precision weapons it can carry, the modern strike 
fighter equates to 700 WWII B-17’s in a strategic 
bombardment role.”142 NAWC’s analysis probes further, “In 
WWII, the CEP of tactical fighter bombers was significantly 
better than that of their strategic counterparts; this was 
primarily the result of their operating at much lower 
altitudes and applying different bombing techniques. A 
tactical fighter bomber of the WWII era had an average CEP 
of 321.3 ft. Fighter bombers of that era normally attacked 
structural point targets with one larger 1,000lb bomb. 
Because it took one fighter bomber to deliver one bomb, it 
took the combined efforts of 41 WWII fighter bombers to kill 
a point target in the WWII era. If one equates this to the 
four precision guided weapons that can be carried by a 
modern strike fighter, the modern strike fighter is 
equivalent to 164 WWII fighter bombers in a tactical strike 
role”. A WWII aircraft carrier had about 90 aircraft, 
depending on type. Therefore it could launch a maximum 
single wave strike of about 80 aircraft, suggesting that a 
single modern F/A-18E/F carrier strike fighter armed with 
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its four unitary JSOWs (Joint Standoff Weapon) or LGBs 
(Laser-guided bomb) is the strike equivalent of two WWII 
carriers.143  
NAWC's analysis neglects to indicate that this scenario 
would most likely apply in only limited conditions, although 
an order of magnitude advance seems appropriate, or perhaps 
two with conditions envisioned by NAWC. Attenuating factors 
are: 
1. If air superiority is in dispute, then first, many 
of the F/A-18s must assume a fighter role so cannot deliver 
ordnance.  
2. Each F/A-18 lost in air combat or in weapon 
delivery is in NAWC terms the equivalent of losing two WWII 
CV deck-loads of strike aircraft.  
3. If an F/A-18 carries ordnance for multiple 
targets, it must travel to each target separately which adds 
to its exposure and risk.144  
Based on NAWC’s analysis it could feasibly be concluded 
that for such efficient lethality the U.S. would not need a 
force of 12 or so CVNs to match our past capability, lest 
the occasion to be in several places simultaneously, and 
therefore we should distribute these highly lethal strike 
aircraft into smaller CVs (to be called CVLs for the 
designation given to the small fast aircraft carriers of the 
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WWII era)145 that can launch and land them. Accepting NAWC’s 
carrier-effectiveness analysis at face value, a CVL fleet 
with a deck-load of 20, or even 10, F/A-18s in each would be 
more flexible, more distributable, and more survivable and 
well worth the additional cost of building smaller "less 
efficient" aircraft carriers. Moreover one may surmise the 
best way to exploit the greatly improved strike accuracy to 
which NAWC correctly points is to deliver the precision 
strikes from a STOVL (F-35B) flying from a very small CV. 
There are size minimums for launch/landing CTOL that don't 
apply to STOVL. To a first approximation, whatever an F/A-18 
can deliver an F-35B STOVL could deliver as well, and at a 
greater range without refueling. Another deduction relating 
to true cost effectiveness is that if one asserts that a new 
system is twice as effective as the system it replaces, then 
by definition, for equal effectiveness one only needs to 
procure half as many of the new system.146 If for example, 
we observe the scope of current operations, the U.S. Navy 
does not need the amount of aircraft for these 
contingencies.  
What OEF and OIF showed was that U.S. sea-based air 
power produced sortie rates that delivered ordnance of less 
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than thirty and fourteen percent of the total U.S. effort, 
respectively. CVN-21, costing at least eight billion USD 
plus per ship, is designed to boost sortie rates up another 
25 percent at “lower costs”, so that carrier aviation could 
“participate” in the large sortie arena with the Air Force. 
That is not what is needed; fire power effects were achieved 
within relatively short periods of time when needed. CVNs 
concentrate too much undistributed firepower for the more 
common, long duration, medium to low intensity conflict 
scenario.  
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates desires the U.S. 
military to “prepare more for fighting future wars against 
insurgents and militias such as those in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, rather than spending so much time and money 
preparing for conventional conflicts.” In unusually strong 
language, Secretary Gates was recently quoted by the 
Washington Post,147 and warned against what he described as 
a tendency in the Pentagon to fall back on Cold War 
mentalities, he said he feared that “lessons from the U.S. 
struggle against insurgencies in Iraq could fade unless 
military commanders understand that today's enemies are the 
foes of the future.” Gates said there must be a balance 
between “meeting today's demands and tomorrow's 
contingencies,” but he expressed concern that the defense 
establishment is not concentrating hard enough on what might 
be needed in future conflicts. He said the armed services 
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and their corporate counterparts should steer technology and 
resources toward battling insurgencies.  
Overall, the kinds of capabilities we will most 
likely need in the years ahead will often 
resemble the kinds of capabilities we need today, 
what we must guard against is the kind of 
backsliding that has occurred in the past, where 
if nature takes its course, these kinds of 
capabilities -- that is, counterinsurgency - tend 
to wither on the vine. 
Secretary Gates indicated that wars of the past 
quarter-century point to a need for counterinsurgency 
strength, including conflicts involving the Soviets in 
Afghanistan, the Israelis in Lebanon and Americans in 
Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.  
Smaller, irregular forces - insurgents, 
guerrillas, terrorists - will find ways, as they 
always have, to frustrate and neutralize the 
advantages of larger, regular militaries," Gates 
said. "And even nation-states will try to exploit 
our perceived vulnerabilities in an asymmetric 
way, rather than play to our inherent strengths. 
Secretary Gates said the U.S. military "would be hard-
pressed to launch a major conventional ground operation 
elsewhere in the world at this time," and added: "Where 
would we sensibly do that? The United States has ample and 
untapped combat power in our naval and air forces, with the 
capacity to defeat any, repeat any, adversary who committed 
an act of aggression, whether in the Persian Gulf, on the 
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Korean Peninsula, or in the Straits of Taiwan. There is a 
risk, but it is a prudent and manageable one."148 
“Counterinsurgency strength” is embodied in 
alternatives to how the U.S. and particularly the U.S. Navy 
is configured today. The advent of modern technology and 
smart weapons make the need for super carriers less 
important. Adapting existing super carriers to modern 
warfare makes sense, but building exclusively large-deck 
carriers in today’s environment does not. U.S. sea-based air 
power must configure itself to confront asymmetric low-
intensity irregular warfare with a view to supporting ground 
forces and SOF from the sea with the appropriate sea-based 
air platform. Flexibility, endurance, remote control and 
persistence coupled with an intelligent weapon system that 
can be made to perform from long distances present a viable 
dispersed alternative to deploying a super carrier and its 
vast support and defense system. Light aircraft carriers, 
coupled with the above cost-effective alternatives and 
equipped with capable modern STOVL aircraft, are a must in 
view of the above comments made by the Secretary of Defense. 
Here is an anecdote that briefly illustrates the notion: 
Indian Springs, Nevada - The sniper never knew 
what hit him. The Marines patrolling the street 
below were taking fire, but did not have a clear 
shot at the third-story window that the sniper 
was shooting from. They were pinned down and 
called for reinforcements. Help came from a 
Predator drone circling the skies 20 miles away. 
As the unmanned plane closed in, the infrared 
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camera underneath its nose picked up the muzzle 
flashes from the window. The sniper was still 
firing when the Predator's 100-pound Hellfire 
missile came through the window and eliminated 
the threat. The airman who fired that missile was 
8,000 miles away, at Creech Air Force Base, NV, 
home of the 432nd air wing. The 432nd officially 
"stood up," on May 1, 2007. One year later, two 
dozen of its drones patrol the skies over Iraq 
and Afghanistan every hour of every day. And 
almost all of them are flown by two-man crews 
sitting in the relative safety of a ground 
control station (GCS) in the Nevada desert.149 
There are several validated and promising innovations 
to air power that undermine the need for a large-deck 
nuclear carrier, in low to medium intensity conflict. 
Specifically, below is a brief survey of just a few: 
UAVs. The MQ-9 Reaper is the bigger sibling of the RQ-
1/MQ-1 Predator UAV. Capable of striking enemy targets with 
on-board weapons, the MQ-9 Reaper UAV has conducted CAS and 
ISR missions. Operational use of Reaper's advanced 
capabilities marks a step forward in the evolution of 
unmanned aerial systems. The Reaper is larger and more 
heavily-armed than the MQ-1 Predator. In addition to its 
traditional ISR capabilities, it is designed to attack time-
sensitive targets with persistence and precision, and 
destroy or disable those targets. The MQ-9 has nearly nine 
times the range, can fly twice as high and carries more 
munitions. It can carry nearly the same payload as an F-16, 
typically two 500-pound laser-guided bombs and four AGM-114 
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Hellfire missiles.150  Unit system cost is $53.5 million in 
2006 fiscal dollars which includes four aircraft 
(unfortunately a small number) with sensors.151  
Warrior UAV. For the near future, the U.S. Army has 
initiated procurement of an Extended Range Multi-Purpose 
unmanned aerial vehicle named the “Warrior.” The ERMP 
Warrior will have the longest range of any UAV system in the 
Army; it will have multiple on-board weapons capable of 
loitering over enemy territories for 36 hours at altitudes 
up to 25,000 feet.152 The Army intends to procure 11 Warrior 
systems, each with 12 aerial vehicles. The new UAV will be 
capable of executing missions such as reconnaissance, 
communications relay, and attack with its multiple weapons, 
and its network connectivity will reduce the sensor-to-
shooter time to better suppress enemy threats. Initial 
operational capability is expected in fiscal year 2009. 
Total program cost is expected to be about $1 billion.153  
Vulture. Further into the future, a revolutionary 
program is being developed by the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Tactical Technology Office called 
“Vulture”. The objective of the Vulture program is to 
develop an aircraft capable of remaining on-station 
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uninterrupted for over five years to perform ISR, and 
communication missions over an area of interest.154 Once 
fielded, it’s logical to expect this technology to evolve 
into an armed version capable of striking time-sensitive 
targets.  
Tactical Land Attack Missile (TLAM). The Office of 
Naval Research (ONR) has been pursuing a supersonic land-
attack missile design since 2004 under the Revolutionary 
Approach to Time-Critical Long-Range Strike (RATTLRS) 
technology demonstration program for a successor to the BGM-
109 Tomahawk. It aims to show the viability of a high-speed 
(Mach 3+) cruise missile that could attack fleeting vehicles 
on land and ships at sea as well as stationary objects in 
conditions under which the ability to hit targets quickly 
(500NM in 15 min.) is paramount. The program is in 
development, and, if the RATTLRS demonstration program is 
successful it hopes to have an operational version around 
2012.155  
Affordable Weapon System (AWS). In March 2002 the 
Office of Naval Research was reported to be developing a 
long-range, low-cost Affordable Missile or Affordable Weapon 
System (AWS) to complement Tomahawk or successive long-range 
systems, capable of speeds up to 200 knots and a range of 
400-600 nautical miles but costing only $30,000 USD. The AWS 
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is designed to provide a complementary system to long-range 
land-attack missiles such as Tomahawk using commercially-
based technology. It is equipped with line-of-sight and 
satellite data links and can fly direct to the target at 
distances of 600 nautical miles using GPS and INS guidance. 
There it can loiter for between four and six hours before 
delivering a 200-lb warhead with precision. A forward 
observer can re-target the weapon in flight, and the weapon 
can be called onto a target within a minute. AWS is expected 
to be launched from a 20-round box launcher, which could be 
installed on smaller surface warships or even amphibious 
warfare vessels.156  
In a classic work on military resistance to change, 
Men, Machines, and Modern Times, the late MIT professor 
Elting E. Morison explains how difficult it is for military 
organizations to abandon familiar weapon systems. He cites 
the instance of the first U.S. Navy ship constructed from 
the beginning with steam propulsion, albeit with sails as 
well. This was the USS Wampanoag, commissioned in 1866. It 
could literally run circles around sailing warships whose 
freedom of maneuver was restricted by the direction and 
force of the wind. The Navy, though, decommissioned the 
Wampanoag in 1868. A board of officers decreed, in part, 
that it would be injurious to the fighting spirit of the 
captain of a ship if he could not see and direct every 
element of his ship from his position on deck. Men in an 
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engine room would be outside of the captain's control. This 
new concept of a steam plant below decks was just too 
revolutionary to win acceptance quickly. Despite the rest of 
the leading navies of the world doing so, the U.S. Navy did 
not build another warship with steam propulsion for 15 
years. Arguments for the much greater operational 
effectiveness of steam propulsion just could not compete 
with the long tradition of sail. In this tradition, there is 
no visible inclination in Navy circles today to evaluate 
whether a carrier-centric Navy is what best suits our 
nation's needs on the seas today and tomorrow. At the same 
time, one does not have to do much more than scratch the 
surface to see that substantial changes in weapons systems 
are taking place. Startling new technologies are becoming 
available. 
These developments of increased accuracy and remote 
control of weapons mean that there is less need for large 
carriers with large numbers of aircraft and large amounts of 
ammunition. A few aircraft with precise weapons can 
accomplish what traditionally has taken much greater effort. 
Even more startling, manned aircraft are needed less. 
Missiles can be launched from ships or submarines hundreds 
of miles away from a target and remotely aimed and guided. 
In addition, political circumstances today do not easily 
allow the large quantities of munitions that putative 
targets of the Cold War era did. For years our carriers 
practiced "Alpha Strikes" against the Soviet Union and its 
allies. These involved as many aircraft as could be loaded 
and launched in a single strike, each with a maximum bomb 
load. With the possible exception of China, there is not 
likely to be a demand for Alpha Strikes in a world of 
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counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations. Warfare 
at sea, then, is inexorably moving in the direction of 
unmanned, remotely controlled weapons that are highly 
accurate and launched at long distances from their targets. 
This, of course, means less exposure for pilots or none if 
missiles are launched well away from the target. That can be 
an important factor in smaller contingencies where U.S. 
interests are less than vital, but where we opt to fight 
nonetheless. It can also mean less collateral damage, which 
can be very important in wars where winning hearts and minds 
is the key.157 
In a study conducted by the DoD Office of Force 
Transformation (OFT) headed by the late Arthur Cebrowski 
titled Alternative Fleet Architecture Design,158 the 
challenges of accurately identifying the appropriate 
composition of the fleet based on forecasting the strategic 
threat in the immediate future and the uncertainties of 
escalating procurement costs in an attempt to achieve the 
hoped-for 375 ship navy are succinctly articulated. The 
theory of network-centric warfare, including the important 
advantages available to the warfighter through the full or 
partial implementation of network-centric capabilities, 
networking at all levels of military operations, and 
networked behavior, provides the basis for one of the key 
design principles for developing an alternative fleet 
platform architecture. Networking allows for a modular, 
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building block approach to military scaling with 
applicability across a broad spectrum of missions. 
Furthermore, the architecture of a fleet with dispersed 
networked surveillance, weapons, and command and control 
(C2) means that platform size can be reduced, while 
increasing performance through networking of an increased 
number of platforms. As platform size is decreased, advances 
in precision and terminal blast effects hold the potential 
to maintain firepower without losing lethality. Technologies 
are being developed to: lighten the payload, thereby 
extending the endurance and range of unmanned systems; 
provide robust data links and integrated sensors to detect 
and target low signature threats; and provide electronic 
warfare (EW) technology and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
technology tailored to threats in the littoral.  
Breakthroughs in technology provide the Navy with the 
opportunity to leap ahead to deliver a fleet far more 
capable than the programmed fleet. High leverage 
technologies and the potential payoff they offer the fleet 
are shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Technology…Opportunities and Payoff159  
 
The firepower of the U.S. Navy and USAF are often a 
duplication of effect when projecting power over land. It is 
not a duplication of effort in the manner, way or conduit 
for delivering the firepower; it is feasible to realize that 
the U.S. Navy and USAF pros and cons could offset each other 
to enable overland strikes. Thus, the USN requires sea-based 
air power for overland power projection, and more 
importantly, sea-based operations in general, but it should 
be more distributed, given the prospects of modern 
technology and the global strategic environment. NWDC’s 
analysis makes a strong argument for the firepower 
capability of a CVN, and in doing so, also illustrates the 
concentration of firepower in one platform, which lends 
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itself to the notion of vulnerability. In OEF and OIF, the 
preponderance of sortie generation and ordnance delivered 
came from the USAF, despite massing several carriers in 
theater. Further, sortie generation capacity of each CVN 
wasn’t maximized throughout the effort. These factors and 
the study conducted by the DoD OFT suggest that U.S. naval 
aviation should seriously consider procurement of smaller, 
more cost effective sea-based air platforms that would allow 
flexibility in tailoring the platform to changing campaign 
requirements without losing lethality. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. National Security Strategy states that America 
is at war against the rise of terrorism, a war that is 
fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder.160 
The NSS also states that “defeating terrorists requires a 
long-term strategy and a break with old patterns; we can no 
longer rely on deterrence to keep terrorists at bay.” The 
NSS provides four pillars for the way ahead in addressing 
this threat: 
1. Prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they 
occur.  
2. Deny weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to rogue 
states and to terrorist allies who would use them without 
hesitation. 
3. Deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of 
rogue states.  
4. Deny the terrorists control of any nation that 
they would use as a base and launching pad for terror.161 
In support of the NSS, the U.S. National Defense 
Strategy calls for continuous transformation. The NDS states 
that “continuous defense transformation is part of a wider 
governmental effort to transform America’s national security 
institutions to meet 21st century challenges and 
opportunities. Just as our challenges change continuously, 
                     
160  George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America," The White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf (accessed June 1, 
2008). 
161  Ibid. 
 92
so too must our military capabilities.” The NDS also states 
that transformation is not only about technology; it is also 
about: 
1. Changing the way we think about challenges and 
opportunities; 
2. Adapting the defense establishment to that new 
perspective; and, 
3. Refocusing capabilities to meet future challenges, 
not those we are already most prepared to meet.162 
The NDS also addresses irregular warfare and states 
that “it will be a key conflict for the foreseeable future. 
Challenges from terrorist extremist organizations and their 
state and non-state supporters will involve our forces in 
complex security problems for some time to come, redefining 
past conceptions of general purpose forces.”163 
To guide American military forces within this global 
threat environment, the Quadrennial Defense Review envisions 
a joint maritime force that “will conduct highly distributed 
operations with a networked fleet that is more capable of 
projecting power in the brown and green waters of coastal 
areas.”164  
                     
162  Donald H. Rumsfeld, "National Defense Strategy of the United 
States of America," Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nds/nds.pdf (accessed September 6, 
2007). 
163  Ibid. 
164  Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (1000 
Defense Pentagon, Washignton D.C. 20301-1000: Department of Defense, 
2006), http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf 
(accessed September 6, 2007). 
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The U.S. National Military Strategy discusses overseas 
presence posture of U.S. military forces and states that 
“enhancing U.S. overseas presence and global footprint must 
improve the ability of regional forces to employ an 
expeditionary approach in response to regional and global 
contingencies. They must remain scalable, supporting plans 
to surge forces during crisis when and where they are 
needed.”165 
In light of these national strategic guiding points, 
the U.S. Navy should seriously reconsider its requirement of 
maintaining the size of its current fleet of super carriers. 
It should explore an immediate shift in procurement strategy 
to more appropriately address threats to national security. 
This thesis concludes that one important and advantageous 
change should be not to spend on solely large-deck carriers. 
To smoothly transform naval aviation, the Navy should invest 
in a blend of CVNs and small to medium carriers, be they 
nuclear or conventional. Smaller “CVLs” provide two 
important capabilities we must seek: 
1. It allows naval aviation to engage a peer 
adversary in a more distributed manner; and, 
2. It allows naval aviation to appropriately tailor 
the size of a carrier strike group in small to medium 
intensity conflict scenarios, some of which will be of long 
duration.  
                     
165  Richard B. Myers, "National Military Strategy of the United 
States of America," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf (accessed 
September 6, 2007). 
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Many other world navies do well and are content with 
the idea of aircraft carriers of 40,000 ton displacement and 
less. The USN does not give the “CV” classification to ships 
within its navy which however are comparable in size and 
capability to ships which other navies are proud to call 
aircraft carriers.166 The key point is - that sea-based air 
is not as critical to the national security as in past eras, 
but it can, and should be, deliverable in smaller packages 
tailored to the situation. This is especially so when more 
cost effective methods to embark sea-based air power exist. 
It is far less costly and risky to embark and operate V/STOL 
aircraft in a combat situation than attempting to recover 
CTOL aircraft aboard a carrier, in difficult conditions, 
that are in a tank-or-eject situation, as described in the 
OEF case analysis - an avoidable risk. The procurement, 
operating and maintenance costs of large-deck carriers with 
catapult and arresting gear is higher than that for a small 
or medium sized air capable V/STOL ship. This type of ship, 
- a “CVL” - with an embarked air wing of highly capable 
strike/fighters of the JSF type, UAV/UCAVs or V-22 Ospreys, 
can be configured for many missions to include airborne 
early warning. They will make for a highly viable 
complement, or potential alternative to CVNs.  
 
 
                     
166  Hore and Hirschfeld, Maritime Aviation, Light and Medium 
Aircraft Carriers into the Twenty First Century, 17. 
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